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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to research the development of the projection of Germany’s 
influence through three crises that have fractured the project know as the European Union 
(EU). The crises in question are the security crisis, the refugee crisis and the Eurozone 
crisis. These three issues that the EU has faced have significantly influenced each state 
within the union and the EU as an organisation as a whole. Thus analysing Germany’s 
political influence on the policies made on the supranational level and comparing them with 
national policies is a good way to determine whether or not the policies practiced nationally 
and supra-nationally overlap.  
Firstly, liberal intergovernmentalism will be used as the theoretical framework for this 
thesis, it will be introduced and conceptualised. Additionally, critical discourse analysis 
will be used for an in depth analysis of the three cases subject to research in this thesis. 
Secondly, the methodology of the research will be provided and explained followed by the 
three case studies.  
The security crisis in the EU refers to Russia’s growing hostility towards the west and 
annexation of Crimea. Secondly, the refugee crisis refers to the Syria migrant crisis that 
started in the beginning of 2014. Since then, over a million people have travelled to the 
outer borders of the EU to seek asylum in Europe. Thirdly, The Eurozone crisis that began 
with the economic collapse of Greece and its inability to meet the requirements of ECB 
(European Central Bank) for financial aid greatly influenced the EMU (European Monetary 
Union) as a whole. The research will be based on official government documents available 
on the German Federal website and only material available in English will be used. Each 
case study will a have set of 5-7 indicators that will project the relationship between 
German and EU- level policies. The indicators are based on the articles of the Treaty of the 
European Union.  
Keywords: liberal intergovernmentalism, Europe, European Union, Germany, critical 
discourse analysis, Greece, refugees, Eurozone crisis, Ukraine crisis, Russia, security 
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Introduction 
Since the end of WWII Germany, of which this research paper will centre around, has 
gradually but firmly increased its importance and projection of influence in Europe. During 
the war’s aftermath, the leaders of the newly established Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) embraced integration into multilateral structures as an important step 
toward fulfilling two of the country’s primary interests: to reconcile with wartime enemies; 
and to gain acceptance as a legitimate actor on the international stage. In order to achieve 
that, foreign policy was identified almost exclusively with the Cold War aims of NATO 
and the European integration project, and a related quest for German unification. During 
the Cold War, West German leaders were reluctant to formulate or pursue national interests 
that could be perceived as undermining a fundamental commitment to the multilateral 
framework as embodied by the Atlantic Alliance, European Community, and United 
Nations. West Germany avoided assuming a leading role within these institutions, 
preferring a low international profile, and seeking to establish a reputation as an ethical 
nation with limited interests beyond supporting the multilateral process itself. (Belkin, 
2009; Lewis and McKenzie, 1995; Haupt, and Kocka, 2012) 
German unification in 1990 and the end of the Cold War represented monumental shifts in 
the geopolitical realities that had defined German foreign policy. Germany was once again 
Europe’s largest country, and the Soviet threat- which had served to unite West Germany 
with its pro-Western neighbours and the United States- ceased to exist. Since the early 
1990s, German leaders have been challenged to exercise a foreign policy grounded in a 
long-standing commitment to multilateralism and an aversion to military force while 
simultaneously seeking to assume the more proactive global role many argue is necessary 
to confront emerging security threats. Until 1994, Germany was constitutionally barred 
from deploying its armed forces abroad. Today, thousands of German troops are deployed 
in peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction missions worldwide. However, as 
Germany’s foreign and security policy continues to evolve, some experts perceive a 
widening gap between the global ambitions of Germany’s political abilities, and a 
consistently sceptical German public. Germany was an early and strong supporter of the 
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EU’s eastern enlargement after the Cold War. This support was based largely on the belief 
that European integration offered an unparalleled mechanism to spread democratic 
governance and associated values to Germany’s immediate neighbours. Many agree that the 
EU’s eastern expansion brought greater stability and democracy to the whole European 
region, today it is a matter of constant debate whether or not further enlargement would 
benefit the people of the EU, more precisely Germany and would it be welcomed at all. An 
ongoing debate on the EU’s “absorption capacity” and growing public demand to better 
define Europe’s borders and to reform EU institutions as the outside security threats 
pressure the Unions’ borders. (Belkin, 2009; Haupt and Kocka, 2012) 
German leaders have used the EU as the primary forum through which to forge a more 
proactive role for Germany on the international stage. German foreign policy in the early- 
to mid-1990s was almost exclusively focused on fostering deeper European integration and 
EU enlargement to the east. A historically strong Franco-German partnership was widely 
considered to be the driving force behind European integration. As two of the EU’s largest 
and most prosperous member states, Germany and France still continue to work closely to 
advance joint interests within the EU. However, the EU’s eastward expansion both 
diminished collective Franco-German decision-making power within the Union and 
compelled Merkel to shift diplomatic focus to managing relations with Germany’s eastern 
neighbours. (Belkin, 2009; Haupt and Kocka, 2012) To some analysts, Merkel’s 
predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, embodied a growing German desire to pursue German 
interests within the EU more assertively. German Chancellor Angela Merkel took office in 
November 2005. Observers attribute Merkel’s initial and somewhat unexpected popularity 
to her leadership in foreign policy and to the relatively strong performance of the German 
economy during the first three years of her term. Merkel has continued this trend, also 
demonstrating a willingness to forge a more proactive role for Germany within Europe. 
This growing assertiveness has at times put Germany at odds with other EU member states, 
causing some to question Germany’s long-standing commitment to European unity. 
German EU policy under Merkel reflects a much cooler enthusiasm for EU enlargement 
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and scepticism of several aspects of European market integration. (Belkin, 2009; Janning, 
2015) 
On the other hand, German foreign policy has been driven by a strong commitment to 
multilateral institutions and a deep-rooted scepticism of military power. Still, German 
leaders have supported and increasingly sought to influence the development of the EU’s 
integration in areas ranging from climate change policy to police and judicial cooperation, 
and have assumed an increasingly significant role in the Union’s evolving Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In some areas, for example Middle East policy, 
Germany’s growing role has been welcomed both within Europe and by the United States. 
In others, such as relations with Russia, Germany’s position has inflamed disagreements 
within the Union. (Peters and Hunold, 1999; Belkin, 2009) Although it continues to 
emphasize the importance of EU-wide consensus on foreign policy issues, Berlin has 
exhibited what some consider a growing willingness to pursue independently defined 
foreign policy interests both within and outside the EU framework, even at the expense of 
European or transatlantic unity. (Belkin, 2009) Unlike with the Middle East, the EU’s 
willingness to move ahead on relations with Ukraine had been a cause of controversy; the 
true target of Russia’s actions in Ukraine was to push back the EU. German foreign policy 
was challenged in several ways. Firstly, Berlin’s foreign policy had consistently favoured 
norms and rules over power in international relations. Secondly, Germany felt strongly 
about defending EU policy, more so than other large EU member states or the US. And 
thirdly, the German-Russian relationship had been significant for Germany not only in 
economic terms, but also politically, as a source of Berlin’s significance in the Western 
context. With these elements of its foreign policy under threat, and the US standing with 
Europe but not taking the lead, organising the EU’s response fell on to Germany. The 
Ukraine crisis also revealed the changing parameters of leadership among the major 
European actors. (Janning, 2015; Haupt and Kocka, 2012) 
Germany rose to the top of EU foreign policy rather by circumstance than by its own doing. 
(Peters and Hunold, 1999; Janning, 2015) Within the European Union, Germany’s 
increasing political weight has been the subject of debate for several years now. Mostly, it 
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has been attributed to the country’s economic strength and, even more so, to the crucial role 
played by Berlin in the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis. As the single largest creditor, 
facing a sceptical constituency at home, the German government’s decisions and its 
parliamentary backing were indispensable in enabling rescue operations for the common 
currency. Germany has reluctantly but firmly taken on the role of leader in the EU and 
since the beginning of the Greek debt crisis started to show more of a self-centred politics 
in the EU. The United Kingdom and France, the other two members of the EU’s “Big 
Three”, have declined in standing, taking second (joint with Sweden) and third place 
respectively in the ECFR Scorecard. (ecfr.eu, 2015; Janning, 2015; Eddy, 2015) And it is 
not necessarily something to worry about. Germany’s modest and austere fiscal policies are 
what is needed in the Eurozone in order to establish a stabile economic environment and 
bail out the troubled EU members. As Eddy writes in the New York Times: “But more than 
anyone, Schäuble (Germany’s financial minister) has come to embody the consensus that 
has helped shape European economic policy for years: that the path to sustained economic 
recovery for financially troubled countries is to slash spending, raise taxes when necessary 
and win back the trust of bond markets and other investors by displaying commitment to 
fiscal prudence — even if that process imposes deep economic pain as it plays out. 
Supporters point to Ireland, Portugal and Spain as nations that have bounced back to 
varying degrees after austerity programs; critics point to Greece, which has remained 
economically troubled.” (Eddy; 2015) It seems that since WWII Germany has gone from 
the villain of Europe to being the hero of it, unwillingly taking on the position and saving 
one nation after another from bankruptcy.  
Following the Paris attacks, there are two topical issues being debated over. The first is the 
migration policy. It concerns the ongoing arrival of refugees, many of them from war torn 
Syria, and the limitations of Germany’s absorption capacity. Recent issues over migrants 
abusing German women have caused outrage not only among locals but also in every other 
EU member state. Many in Germany have questioned whether the chancellor has put the 
public order in the country at risk. The second debate is about Germany’s role in European 
security. Is Berlin doing enough to provide European security, or is it mostly benefitting 
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from a security order that others are willing to build and defend, even with human lives if it 
comes to it? There is a fundamental difference now to previous episodes in this debate. As 
stated before, German engagement in conflicts and wars was largely abstract for Germans 
and they preferred to stay away from armed conflict, now the link to other parts of the 
world has become very tangible. People are fleeing war torn Syria and the horror of the 
Islamic State, and Germans feel the impact in their local communities, where the 
authorities, NGOs and citizens are struggling to keep up with the numbers of refugees and 
to support the needs of newcomers. At this stage Angela Merkel’s political future is tied to 
the management of this crisis, not only on national level but on the EU level. (Möller; 
2015) 
Liberal intergovernmentalism as a theory shall be analysed in order to ascertain why it is 
the most suitable framework for this thesis. The reasons why LI is a strong theory and thus 
a good conceptual background will be shown in the light of the paper written by Sutton and 
Staw, which formulates five elements that are used instead of theories in papers. Two 
paradigms of the projection of Germany’s influence will be assessed- more precisely the 
national and supranational influence of Germany on the policies connected to the cases 
analysed. The aim of the case studies is to dissect the complex issues taking place in the EU 
and within its immediate neighbouring areas as well as one can. The three crises that 
chosen for this thesis are the security crisis in the EU, the Eurozone crisis which started 
with the financial collapse of Greece and the on-going refugee crisis the EU is currently 
trying to find a solution to.  
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) theory in explaining Germany’s role in the EU 
decision making process  
In this section of the thesis, liberal intergovernmentalism as a theory shall be analysed in 
order to ascertain why it is the most suitable framework for this thesis. The objective of this 
section is to present an informative, detailed and effective overview of the theoretical 
approach chosen and to briefly contrast LI with supranational governance theory as it is the 
greatest oppose of liberal intergovernmentalism in IR theories. The reasons why LI is a 
strong theory and thus a good conceptual background will be shown in the light of the 
paper written by Sutton and Staw, which formulates five elements that are used instead of 
theories in papers. Comparing LI theory to the five points will show the difference between 
a strong theory and the substitutes sometimes used in research. (Sutton and Staw, 1995) 
Firstly, it is necessary to establish a common ground on how a theory is understood in this 
thesis. For Sutton and Staw a theory is simply “…an answer to queries of why. ….Theory 
is about the connections among phenomena, a story about why acts, events structure, and 
thoughts occur. Theory emphasises the nature of causal relationships, identifying what 
comes first as well as the timing of such events. Strong theory, delves into underlying 
processes so as to understand the systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or non-
occurrence. It often burrows deeply into microprocesses, laterally into neighbouring 
concepts, or in an upward direction, tying itself to broader social phenomena. It is usually 
laced with a set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments…. A good theory 
explains predicts, and delights.” (Sutton and Staw; 1995; pp 9) From this description of a 
good theory one can derive a set of five points which a strong theory should fulfil:  
 Emphasises the nature of causal relationships, identifying what comes first as well 
as the timing of such events 
 Delves into underlying processes so as to understand the systematic reasons for a 
particular occurrence or non-occurrence 
 Burrows deeply into microprocesses, laterally into neighbouring concepts, or in an 
upward direction, tying itself to broader social phenomena. 
 Is usually laced with a set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments 
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 Explains predicts, and delights 
Liberal intergovernmentalism- a theory formulated by Andrew Moravcsik offers an 
explanation to the phenomena of European integration. Originally composed by Stanley 
Hoffmann- who was in essence a representative of the realist school of thought, 
intergovernmentalism set to offer an alternative to neofunctionalist approach to European 
integration. Hoffmann, contrastingly to Moravcsik, did not set out to create a new theory, 
he just disagreed with the neofunctionalist explanation of European integration. It embraced 
the realist idea that states are the central actors in an anarchic environment where there is 
no higher regulatory power. (Saurugger, 2014) Its main argument was that states have full 
control over the level and speed of integration. An increase of power in the international 
level was seen as the result of a direct choice of the member states in the organisation. 
Intergovernmentalism rejected the idea of spillover (the notion that integration between 
states in one sector will inadvertently create strong incentive for integration in other 
sectors) which was one of the core ideas of neofunctionalism. The development and 
popularity of the intergovernmentalist theory stagnated with the halt in the European 
integration from the 1970-s until the relaunching of the single market and European 
integration in 1986 with the Single European Act.  
Moravcsik, did not wish to contradict Hoffmann’s ideas, but to build on the ones Hoffmann 
had come up with and to answer the questions proposed by the opponents of LI in order to 
develop a more conclusive theory of European integration. This was achieved and 
composed in his 1998 book “Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht” which has become a widely used source in explaining European 
integration. According to Moravcsik in its core LI has two core assumptions:  
 States are actors in an anarchic system and can achieve their goals by interstate 
bargaining and negotiation, not by a centralised power that enforces rules on its 
member states. 
 States are rational actors. The decision to cooperate and to establish international 
institutions comes from rational choices and intergovernmental negotiations.  
(Moravcsik, A and Schimmelfennig, F; 1998, pp 68) 
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In addition to the two core assumptions presented above, it is important to highlight the 
three stage approach to the decision by states to cooperate:  
Stages of negotiation National preference 
formation 
Interstate bargaining Institutional choice 
Alternative 
independent variables 
underlying each other 
What is the source of 
underlying national 
preferences? 
Given national 
preferences, what 
explains the efficiency 
and distributional 
outcomes of interstate 
bargaining? 
Given substantive 
agreement, what 
explains the transfer of 
sovereignty to 
international 
institutions? 
Economic interests or 
geopolitical interests? 
Asymmetrical 
interdependence or 
supranational 
entrepreneurship? 
Federalist ideology or 
centralised 
technocratic 
management or more 
credible commitment? 
Observed outcomes of 
each stage 
Underlying national 
preferences. 
Agreements or 
substance.  
Choice to delegate or 
pool decision-making 
in international 
institutions. 
(Moravcsik, A.; 1998) 
Each of the stages requires its own theoretical framework and in its essence the table above 
offers a very basic and fundamental explanation of LI theory. National preference 
formation formulates a specific set of policy goals and also basic national objectives. They 
reflect the objectives of those domestic groups which influence the state apparatus. 
Secondly, states develop strategies and bargain with one another to reach substantive 
goals/agreements that realize these national preferences more efficiently than do unilateral 
actions (Cost and benefit calculation; absolute and relative gains calculation).Thirdly, states 
choose whether or not to delegate and pool sovereignty in international institutions that 
secure the substantive agreements they have made (they make their commitments credible). 
(Moravcsik, 1998) Each of these three stages interacts with one another and in the end 
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when the benefit is greater than the cost. LI assumes the position that supranational powers 
have the powers they have because they have been given those powers by the member 
states.  
In addition to the previous, the two-level game theory acts simultaneously with the three-
stage approach to cooperate. The parts of the two-level game (national- supra-national 
level) represent the interests of domestic and international policy makers. The domestic and 
international negotiators compose a group of “win-sets” (outcomes that could possibly be 
approved by domestic interest groups). When the national and international “win-sets” 
match, international agreements occur. The interaction between domestic and international 
politics and strategisation becomes a “two-level game”. (Moravcsik, 1998) This approach is 
explained additionally by Bellamy and Weale in their paper “Political legitimacy and 
European monetary union: contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of two-level 
games; Journal of European Public Policy”:  
“…..the state parties are thus engaged in a two-level game, in which the terms of the 
agreement have to be simultaneously acceptable to other negotiating parties and to their 
domestic constituents. Simultaneity in this context does not mean ’occurring at the same 
time’, but indicates that any international agreement must fulfil two sets of conditions. 
First, an international agreement requires ’fair dealing’ among states in their relations with 
one another as the representatives of their peoples. Second, states must ensure the general 
acceptability of the agreement to their respective peoples and be able to justify their 
international commitments, including any provisions for side payments, as being a 
reasonable way of advancing their joint and several common interests. Unless this second 
condition is met, so that a state can guarantee the backing of the people it represents, no 
other state party to the putative contract can be confident that a commitment made to it is 
credible.” (Bellamy and Weale, 2015;pp 8)  
This approach explains the democracy requirement set on all the EU member states because 
without the backing of the people living in the member nations no agreement made on the 
supranational level would be viable. Local or national-level agreement acceptance by their 
respective peoples also ensures the agreements’ credibility even when local governments 
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change as it is not a regime change but a democratic election of leaders. Democracy 
guarantees some form of stability but also ensures that all members of the agreement have 
similar normative values.  
Criticism 
As is the case with any theory, criticism is not unknown for LI. In this sub-section the most 
common and frequently mentioned problems highlighted by the opposers of LI will be 
discussed. Where possible an answer to the criticism by Moravcsik or another LI defender 
will follow.  
 Should be an approach, not a theory because it cannot be empirically and 
theoretically refuted. (Rosamond, 2006; Moss, 2000) 
 Unreliability of Moravcsik’s sources on which he has built his work. (Lieshout et al, 
2004) 
 The rationality assumption in the centre of LI is questioned (Rosamond, 2006) 
 The two-level game approach- too simplistic (the number of levels in a realistic 
political debate is a lot bigger. In order to explain the distinctiveness of the EU 
system a multi-level game approach should be introduced instead. (Rosamond, 
2006) 
 Superficial treatment of the consequences of institutional choice- only France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom are observed in Moravcsik’s 1998 book “Choice 
for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht” which 
implies that only the interests of larger states are important. (Franchino, 2012) 
These large countries will offer either ‘financial side payments or symbolic 
concessions’ to the smaller ones to achieve their grand economic bargains 
(Moravcsik; 1998). As a consequence, intergovernmental bargaining resulted in 
treaty reforms that were Pareto superior and Pareto efficient for large member 
states. (Finke, 2009) 
 Moravcsik rejects the notion of spillover in European integration, instead he insists 
that further economic integration has taken place because of pressure from 
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exporters, national competitiveness, plus fiscal and monetary responsibility. 
(Moravcsik, 1998) 
 LI discounts geopolitical actors such as the Suez crisis and German reunification. 
(Moss, 2000) 
o Vachudova and Moravcsik discuss geopolitical actors in the light of LI in 
their 2003 article “National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement” by 
stating that admitting new member states into the EU provides the union 
with new markets and stability that is vital for the well-being of the union 
which shows that geopolitical actors are not discounted at all. Instead, they 
go on by stating that even the financial benefits new members get from 
CAP, for example, is to protect the interests of the union, more than the 
newcomers as the number of farmers in the old member states is rapidly 
diminishing. Politically, accepting new members lessens illegal immigration 
into the union and gives the “old” EU a better control over criminal activity 
in the new region, limiting the outside security risks for the EU. (Vachudova 
and Moravcsik; 2003) 
 LI has been criticized for providing mere ‘snapshot’ views of individual 
intergovernmental bargaining episodes and for failing to account for how 
integration decisions at one point in time are shaped and constrained by the effects 
of earlier integration decisions. (Schimmelfennig, 2015) 
o In defense of liberal intergovernmentalism Schimmelfennig argues that LI is 
indeed a baseline theory for European integration and “…offers no specific 
propositions to account for the crisis as such…” in his article “Liberal 
intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis” in which the crisis refers to 
the Euro area (EA) crisis. To further his standpoint, he continues: “….The 
EA’s responses to the crisis, however, can be explained plausibly as a result 
of intergovernmental bargaining based on partly converging and partly 
diverging member state interests and designed to strengthen the credibility 
of member state commitments to the common currency. National 
preferences resulted from strong interdependence in the EA and the fiscal 
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position of its member states: a common preference for the preservation of 
the euro was accompanied by divergent preferences regarding the 
distribution of adjustment costs.” (Schimmelfennig, 2015; pp 3) What he 
means is that LI does not and is not supposed to explain the EA crisis. What 
LI theory successfully does and is meant to do is to explain the 
developments in European integration: “…..negotiations produced a co-
operative solution averting the breakdown of the EA and strengthening the 
credibility of member state commitments, asymmetrical interdependence 
resulted in a burden-sharing and institutional design that reflected the 
preferences of Germany and its allies predominantly.”(Schimmelfennig, 
2015; pp 3-4) 
Supranational governance (SG) theory  
The leading challenger of LI in European integration theories is supranational governance 
theory which has its roots in neofunctionalism and is considered to be the revised version of 
it (neo neofunctionalism) after Haas, the main proponent of the theory, declared 
neofunctionalism to be obsolete as it could not explain the developments in Europe. 
Supranational governance as a theory was introduced to the world of European integration 
by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz in 1997 with their paper “European integration and 
supranational governance”. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz claim that their theory is not a 
revised version of neofunctionalism, but a new approach derived not only from SG, but also 
from transactionalism and institutionalism, it offers a new approach to explaining European 
integration and an alternative to LI. Their main argument is that the EU has transformed 
itself from an intergovernmental arrangement into a supranational polity. Member state 
governments do not have full control over supranational institutions or outcomes of 
integration. The notion of spillover (unintended consequences in SG) is central to this 
theory as was the case with neofunctionalosm. No single state has the power to fire the 
“agent”- the supranational institution. (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz; 1997) 
The great debate between LI and supranational governance theory:  
Integration   WHY   EU (shape of the)   Driving Moravcsik 
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EU (has an impact on)   WHY    National governance 
   Drives supranational governance theorists  
As one can see from this simple scheme above, the two theories oppose each other to the 
core. Liberal intergovernmentalism and supranational governance look like mirror images 
of each other. SG is unsuccessful in capturing the diversity of European integration which 
LI does, it also cannot explain the integration which has not been triggered by member 
states, not supranational institutions thus showing that LI is more successful in explaining 
the developments in European integration. (Branch and Ohrgaard, 1999) 
SG leaves nations almost out of the game- into a reactive role in European integration, 
insinuating that the role of states is merely to adjust with whatever is decided 
supranationally. That is known not to be true and the extremely different Syria refugee 
politics practiced by the EU member states is an excellent example. Although a common 
EU area issue, states have shown their national interests first and foremost when making 
decision on how many refugees to accommodate, even by reinstating borders and giving 
them free pass through their states into the neighbouring ones, not taking into account the 
external supranational pressure into doing the opposite. This shows that common decision 
making depends on the interests of the state firstly and when national and supranational 
interests find common ground, the possibility to move forward exists. One might ask then, 
why do states decide to accept refugees at all. An answer lies in the interest in not to lose all 
the benefits of cooperation with EU members. In order to avoid internal tensions and to 
secure their future benefits from cooperating, states prefer to negotiate and achieve a 
compromise suitable for the national and supranational level. The possibility for states to 
dictate their national refugee quotas is proof of that.  
Conclusion  
In the beginning of the theory section of this paper a set of five points that constitute a good 
theory was introduced. They were the following:  
 Emphasises the nature of causal relationships, identifying what comes first as well 
as the timing of such events. 
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 Delves into underlying processes so as to understand the systematic reasons for a 
particular occurrence or non-occurrence. 
 Burrows deeply into microprocesses, laterally into neighbouring concepts, or in an 
upward direction, tying itself to broader social phenomena. 
 Is usually laced with a set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments 
 Explains, predicts, and delights. 
(Sutton and Staw; 1995; pp 9) 
In order to determine the value of LI as a theory, one can simply compare the provided 
information to the points above: Emphasises the nature of causal relationships, identifying 
what comes first as well as the timing of such events. The three stage approach introduced 
as a simple explanation of the core of what LI is about provides one with exactly the 
demands of the first point. It emphasises the causal relationship between the three stages of 
negotiation, whilst identifying what comes first as well as last. National preference 
formation is the first stage of the three stages, interstate bargaining comes secondly and 
institutional choice lastly. Delves into underlying processes so as to understand the 
systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or non-occurrence. Every phase in the three 
stage approach is fully explained in order to understand the reasons behind the occurrence. 
Burrows deeply into microprocesses, laterally into neighbouring concepts, or in an upward 
direction, tying itself to broader social phenomena. LI explains the causal relationship 
between the three stages of negotiation, the process of integration, union enlargement, the 
role of interest groups, and geopolitical occurrences as proven beforehand. Is usually laced 
with a set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments. LI theory relies on the 
existing developments of the EU which provide the theory with an empirical falsifiable 
proof that are convincing and logical. The theory explains what happens both on domestic 
and international level. Explains, predicts, and delights. The phenomenon of integration is 
explained by the rational choice of each EU member state. The theory predicts the 
occurrences on the national level in each stage of decision-making. Where delight is 
concerned, Moravcsik and liberal intergovernmentalism have become invaluable among IR 
theorists and academics who research the European integration process.   
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Methodology 
Research Overview  
The three crises that were chosen for research for this thesis are the security crisis, the 
refugee crisis and the Eurozone crisis in the EU. These three issues that the EU has faced 
have significantly influenced each state within the union and the EU as an organisation as a 
whole. Thus analysing Germany’s political influence on the policies made on the 
supranational level and comparing them with national policies was a good way to 
determine whether or not the policies practiced nationally and supra-nationally overlap. The 
security crisis in the EU refers to Russia’s growing hostility towards the west and 
annexation of Crimea. The tense relations between EU and Russia have forced the EU to 
overlook cooperation and armament of the EU member nations. The sanctions set on goods 
imported from Russia and limited exportable goods to Russia have not had notably 
prosperous effects on Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine. Rather it has taken quite a hostile 
stance against the EU. The refugee crisis refers to the Syria migrant crisis that started in the 
beginning of 2014. Since then, over a million people have travelled to the outer borders of 
the EU to seek asylum in Europe. This has caused many nations to reinstate their state 
borders and the continued existence of the Schengen area is questioned. Due to the amount 
of people travelling to and through various nations of Europe, the ability to cope with the 
vast crowd is also under question.  
Most of the pressure falls on the nations at the Mediterranean region and on some of the 
welfare states where they wish to travel to (Finland, Sweden, Germany, France, etc) and 
complaints about refusal to accept any refugees or a very limited number of them is not 
unfounded. The refugee situation has gone out of hand in the EU daily news about the 
refugee situation has become the new normal. Thirdly, The Eurozone crisis that began with 
the economic collapse of Greece and its inability to meet the requirements of ECB 
(European Central Bank) for financial aid greatly influenced the EMU (European Monetary 
Union) as a whole. EU’s credibility as a financial partner fell noticeably and the economies 
of many if not all of the member states suffered. The existence of the Eurozone came under 
question when Greece threatened to leave the Eurozone. The issue is not even close to 
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being resolved even though Greece has opted to cooperate with the Eurozone members to 
receive the offered aid packages. Germany has played a central part in the attempt to solve 
the issue and the relationship between Greece and Germany has been rather tense since the 
austerity measures necessary for financial aid were introduced. Greece has maintained its 
standpoint that the demands put on the country to receive the financial aid is unreasonable. 
Thus the “Greek problem” continues to be one of the key issues within the EU.  
Research Design: 
This thesis did not propose to assess the direct impact of German influence but rather how 
it is framed in Germany’s political discourse, both at the national and supra-national level. 
When studying the three proposed cases the thesis focused on the analysis of Germany’s 
official discourse as reflected by official speeches/releases from the German government 
officials as primary resources. Therefore the research methodology was qualitative as 
qualitative research method helped to conduct an exploratory research in order to gain an 
understanding of the underlying reasons, projections and motivations behind Germany’s 
influence in policy making when analysing the selected cases. The number of cases that 
were chosen for this dissertation was three and because of this the small-N comparative 
study was the most suitable option for conducting research. The three case studies were 
divided into three separate chapters in order to give due attention to each of them and have 
an appropriate structure for this dissertation.  
Only official German government releases were used for the case study part of this thesis. 
The small-N comparative study of the three cases helped to identify – in the light of 
comparable identified features – indicators in the official discourse of Germany’s influence 
in the different policy areas analysed, the number of documents that were analysed for the 
set out research objective was substantial. As stated before, the objective of this thesis was 
to investigate three cases through the discourse of the German elected officials. The cases 
were as follows: social policy in the EU- justice and home affairs; security crisis in the EU- 
common foreign and security policy; EMU crisis and Germany’s role in policy making on 
the EU level. 
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Observable implications of LI when assessing the projection of Germany's influence at the 
national and the EU level in three recent crises; the research timeline 
Crisis Research 
time span 
Indicators that show the development of Germanys 
power in EU level decision-making 
Refugee crisis January 
2014-March 
2016 
 The Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and equality between women and men prevail. 
(Germany’s policies to ensure asylum 
compared to supranational policies when 
analysing the refugee crisis, changes made in 
this area during the crisis, policy changes on 
border control) 
 The Union shall offer its citizens an area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with 
appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime. 
(Germany’s policies in these areas compared to 
supranational policies, decisions/changes made 
in this area) 
 The Union shall combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice 
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and protection, equality between women and 
men, solidarity between generations and 
protection of the rights of the child. It shall 
promote economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. 
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic 
diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's 
cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. 
(Germany’s policies in these areas compared to 
supranational policies, decisions/changes made 
in this area) 
 In its relations with the wider world, the Union 
shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, 
the sustainable development of the Earth, 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and 
the protection of human rights, in particular 
the rights of the child, as well as to the strict 
observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter. 
(Germany’s values compared to the EU’s, work 
done to promote and develop the values and 
beliefs within the EU and outside) 
 The Union shall develop a special relationship 
with neighbouring countries, aiming to 
establish an area of prosperity and good 
24 
 
neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union and characterised by close and peaceful 
relations based on cooperation. (Germany’s 
policies in these areas compared to 
supranational policies, decisions/changes made 
in this area) 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European 
Union; 2012) 
Security crisis November 
2013-March 
2016 
 common security and defence policy is an 
integral part of the common foreign and 
security policy (statements and policies 
towards/about the situation in Ukraine; changes 
in policies because of the situation in Ukraine) 
 the common security and defence policy shall 
include the progressive framing of a common 
Union defence policy (common defence policy 
against Russia’s aggression) 
 member states shall make civilian and military 
capabilities available to the Union for the 
implementation of the common security and 
defence policy, to contribute to the objectives 
defined by the Council (what are the 
objectives? Willingness to contribute military 
means. (for securing border members against 
potential aggression)) 
 decisions relating to the common security and 
defence policy, including those initiating a 
mission as referred to in this Article, shall be 
adopted by the Council acting unanimously on 
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a proposal from the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
or an initiative from Member State (initiatives 
taken/decisions made) 
 the Council may entrust the execution of a task, 
within the Union framework, to a group of 
Member States in order to protect the Union's 
values and serve its interests (participation in 
execution of tasks/ defining of interests) 
 those Member States whose military 
capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which 
have made more binding commitments to one 
another in this area with a view to the most 
demanding missions shall establish permanent 
structured cooperation within the Union 
framework (readiness to cooperate; level of 
military capabilities (shows Germany’s 
diversity and readiness in participating in 
policy enforcement- which policies count?) 
 if a Member State is the victim of armed 
aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid 
and assistance by all the means in their power, 
in accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter (attention to potential 
enforcement of this policy) 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European 
Union; 2012) 
Eurozone crisis October  Minimum reserves: ECB may require credit 
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2009-March 
2016 
institutions established in Member States to 
hold minimum reserve on accounts with the 
ECB and national central banks in pursuance 
of monetary policy objectives. Regulations 
concerning the calculation and determination 
of the required minimum reserves may be 
established by the Governing Council. In cases 
of noncompliance the ECB shall be entitled to 
levy penalty interest and to impose other 
sanctions with comparable effect. (How does 
Germany’s vision of minimum reserves comply 
with the Council’s vision) 
 Sanctions: The Council shall, in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Article 41, 
define the basis for minimum reserves and the 
maximum permissible ratios between those 
reserves and their basis, as well as the 
appropriate sanctions in cases of 
noncompliance.(Germany’s vision of penalties 
or noncompliance sanctions- attention to 
potential enforcement of this policy; the 
proposed necessity for punishment) 
 The Governing Council may, by a majority of 
two thirds of the votes cast, decide upon the use 
of such other operational methods of monetary 
control as it sees fit, respecting Article 2. The 
Council shall, in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article 41, define the 
scope of such methods if they impose 
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obligations on third parties. (Germany’s 
offered methods to dealing with the Greek 
crisis and the methods and used so far) 
 The ECB shall: 
— make recommendations and deliver 
opinions. (How much of the delivered 
decisions, recommendations and 
regulations collide with Germany’s 
national policy) 
 The Union shall respect the equality of Member 
States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local 
self-government. It shall respect their essential 
State functions, including ensuring the 
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining 
law and order and safeguarding national 
security. In particular, national security 
remains the sole responsibility of each Member 
State. (Germany’s policies in ensuring the 
safeguarding of this Article vs supranational 
policies when researching the Eurozone crisis) 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European 
Union; 2012) 
 
Discourse analysis 
In order to consistently capture the features of Germany’s discourse as an indicator of the 
country’s influence on the EU decision-making process critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
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was applied for the three case studies. Applying discourse analysis aided in establishing 
subjects and objects in this thesis. It was also beneficial in not only looking at the cause and 
context of a specific event (for example the annexation of Crimea) but to understand and 
capture the broader multi-dimensionality of the issues and their comparative significance 
emerging from those specific defining events. Discourse analysis was greatly beneficial in 
identifying the role of the actors in the crises chosen for analysis for this thesis and to 
examine how Germany’s influence is framed by them. This technique greatly helped to do 
an in depth policy research and additionally analyse the structures behind the decisions 
made by Germany. In fact, CDA is a way of talking about and acting upon the world which 
both constructs and is constructed by a set of social practices. 
The book on discourse analysis by Wodak and Meyer (2001) introduces some key concepts 
that are central in discourse analysis and concurringly explain why this approach was 
chosen for this thesis. “In general CDA asks different research questions….., it is a fact that 
CDA follows a different and a critical approach to problems, since it endeavours to make 
explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden, and thereby to derive results 
which are of practical relevance.” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001; pp 15) As is stated in this 
segment taken from said book from a chapter written by Michael Meyer CDA is not a 
common choice for conducting research but it is a way to assess developments in a 
completely new light and possibly make relevant discoveries. Additionally, Meyers writes: 
“One important characteristic arises from the assumption of CDA that all discourses are 
historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context. In 
accordance with this CDA refers to such extra linguistic factors as culture, society, and 
ideology. In any case, the notion of context is crucial for CDA, since this explicitly includes 
social psychological, political and ideological components and thereby postulates an 
interdisciplinary procedure.” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001; pp15) This understanding of the 
importance of context and other factors that are not traditionally factored in when 
conducting analysis is of centre value for this dissertation as evaluating Germany’s 
influence on the policies on the three crises, all of the abovementioned factors play a large 
role in the outcome.  
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The chart below introduces the process of CDA and how it links with the theory used as the 
framework for the work done, which in this thesis is liberal intergovernmentalism. It is seen 
as an endless system of connected actions and presents a simple explanation of what CDA 
entails and the methodology of CDA.  
 
Wodak and Meyer, 2001; pp 19 
The conceptualisation: the selection of theoretical concepts and relations, assumptions part 
of this chart are the indicators that show the development of Germany’s power in EU level 
decision-making introduced above in the table.  
Conclusion 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter the three crises that were chosen for research for 
the thesis at hand are the security crisis, the refugee crisis and the Eurozone crisis in the 
EU. The security crisis in the EU refers to Russia’s growing hostility towards the west and 
annexation of Crimea. The refugee crisis refers to the Syria migrant crisis that started in the 
beginning of 2015 and the Eurozone crisis to the economic collapse of Greece and the 
subsequent effect this incident has had on the Eurozone and the EU as a whole. When 
studying the three proposed cases the thesis focused on the analysis of Germany’s official 
discourse as reflected by official speeches/releases from the German government officials 
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as primary resources. In order to consistently capture the features of Germany’s discourse 
as an indicator of the country’s influence on the EU decision-making process critical 
discourse analysis was applied for the three case studies.  
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Case studies 
Two paradigms of the projection of Germany’s influence will be assessed- more precisely 
the national and supranational influence of Germany on the policies connected to the cases 
analysed. The aim of the case studies is to dissect the complex issues taking place in the EU 
and within its immediate neighbouring areas as well as one can. The three crises that were 
chosen for this thesis are the security crisis in the EU, the Eurozone crisis which started 
with the financial collapse of Greece and the on-going refugee crisis the EU is currently 
trying to find a solution to. As was previously stated the spectrum through which the 
analysis shall be applied to the cases is liberal intergovernmentalism and additionally, 
discourse analysis will be used so this thesis would have a thorough and structured case 
assessment.  
Security crisis 
Although recently overshadowed by the terrorist attacks in Europe, the Syrian crisis and the 
large amount of refugees entering Europe each day- the crisis in Ukraine has and will be a 
big influence on the 21st century international politics. The annexation of Crimea is still 
today one of the most important issues the EU has faced since it questions the security of a 
sovereign nation and its borders in the neighbourhood of the EU. The annexation of Crimea 
by Russia has diminished EU-Russia relations and Russia is under a number of economic 
sanctions. Diplomatic relations between the two sides have been strained ever since and the 
security of Europe became questionable as the threat from Russia is regarded as probable. 
Russian air forces have in numerous times violated EU and NATO member nations’ 
borders, entering into their airspace with fighter jets without any permission from the 
recipient country. These acts of border violation reached a new critical level when a fighter 
jet trespassing in Turkish airspace was shot down by the Turkish army forces in November, 
2015. Russia has fiercely disputed the location of the jet claiming it never entered Turkish 
airspace and the fighter jet was merely near the border in Syria trying to locate the Islamic 
State (IS, ISIS or ISIL) terrorist militants. (BBC News; 2015) 
With the increasing terror Europe is facing, many government officials- including prime 
ministers from Belgium and France and the president of France- from all over the EU are 
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saying that they are at war. Europe has come to the realisation of how vulnerable it is. It is 
very difficult to prevent these attacks as it is impossible to keep an eye on everyone in a 
public space in a democratic community. As the availability of information has become 
simpler than ever today and the possibilities for communication are countless, creating 
chaos, building bombs and gathering popularity is easy. Media which transfers all the major 
events to every corner of the world plays its own part as gathering readers and viewers 
makes them stream and name their news as conspicuously as possible. This inadvertently 
brings supporters for the terrorist groups as well. There exists no adequate information 
sharing and cooperation in order to ensure security in Europe. To avoid or prevent the 
terrorist attacks and safeguard the sovereignty of the bordering EU nations, the EU needs to 
unite their security forces and start working together to avoid creating a new normalcy in 
the European community- that is- living with the fear of terror. With the ever-looming 
threat on the lives of the citizens of the EU, the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) has again emerged as one of the biggest priorities for the EU. 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
The idea of a common defence policy is not a modern one. It first emerged after WWII 
between the original six EU founders to prevent future conflicts in the region and to defend 
themselves from potential threats the Treaty of Brussels already had a defence clause in it. 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, a mutual defence clause was created, which is a key element of 
the CSDP. The CSDP replaces and enlarges the former European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). The aim of the policy is the establishment of a common European defence 
capability. But with the emergence of NATO it has become of secondary value- or at least 
was until the uncontrolled influx of refugees from Syria and the terrorist attacks in the large 
metropoles in the EU. Nevertheless, the main objectives of the CSDP and NATO are very 
similar and include such tasks as setting common objectives for EU countries in terms of 
military capacity, harmonising EU countries' operational needs through the notion of 
“pooling and sharing” military capabilities, making military expenditure more effective and 
strengthening the defence sector’s industrial and technological base. The CSDP is just more 
of a European- centred outlet for further cooperation. (Eur-lex; 2015) The defence policy 
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can also be seen as a way of decentralising the power the United States has obtained in 
NATO and taking and relocating it to the EU. It is a policy for cooperating militarily even 
when the U.S. will not wish to take part of the military action (for example conflict with 
Russia over Ukraine).  
Another reason for the CSDP can be seen as an aim to get the EU countries to take 
measures to improve their military capacities in order to be more self-sufficient. The wish 
for self-sufficiency emerged as a priority after the Bosnian war where Europe’s security 
was directly connected to the decisions made in Washington as Europe did not have the 
means to protect themselves from potential threat alone. The wish was not to work 
independently from NATO but to strengthen the European defence capacity in order to 
create a more equal partnership between Europe and the USA. The provisions on the 
Common Security and Defence policy are brought out in Article 42 of the Treaty on the 
European Union, which can be seen in Appendix 1. Other than the Common Security and 
Defence policy in the Treaty, there are other policies in the Treaty that outline the 
cooperation tactics and set the judicial grounds for military cooperation in order to ensure 
security of its member states. For example: 
Article 25 (ex Article 12 TEU) of the Treaty states that:  
The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by: 
 defining the general guidelines; 
 adopting decisions defining: 
o (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union; 
o (ii) positions to be taken by the Union; 
o arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points 
(i) and (ii) 
 strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of 
policy 
Article 26 (ex Article 13 TEU) 
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 The European Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security 
policy, including for matters with defence implications. It shall adopt the necessary 
decisions. 
If international developments so require, the President of the European Council 
shall convene an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in order to define 
the strategic lines of the Union's policy in the face of such developments. 
 The Council shall frame the common foreign and security policy and take the 
decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the basis of the general 
guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council. 
The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the 
Union. 
 The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High 
Representative and by the Member States, using national and Union resources. 
 The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively 
and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with 
the Union's action in this area 
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual 
political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations. 
The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.- it 
has not been as visible in media coverage as has been German wish to ensure member 
states compliance with these rules. Germany has somehow taken over the responsibilities 
that have been given to the Council and the High Representative of the EU.  
Article 43 
 The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use 
civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, 
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humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may 
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in 
combating terrorism in their territories.---The Crimean so called “Green Men” can 
also be defined as terrorists as they did not officially act as Russian troops and were 
never recognized by Russia as its military. 
 The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, 
defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their 
implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant 
contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the 
civilian and military aspects of such tasks. 
Article 44 
 Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the 
Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States 
which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member 
States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task. 
 Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed 
of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. 
Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task 
entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and 
conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1 of the 
Treaty. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union; 2012) 
These four Articles in addition to the CDP are the policies in the Treaty that in theory 
should lay the groundwork for security and military cooperation in the EU.  
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The values mentioned during numerous occasions in the Treaty make one question what 
they actually are. Many argue that the term “European value” is in itself and empty signifier 
as there are no real mutually agreed upon or accepted values to uphold or the values change 
during times of difficulty such as crises. For the sake of this thesis the values mentioned 
previously will be the ones named in Article 2 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of 
the European Union:  
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail. 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union; 2012) 
Ukraine 
The fact that Russia was able to annex the Crimea in Ukraine did not really come as such a 
surprise to Ukrainians as they claim to the western countries. This argument is supported by 
Igor Taro, who has a blog in Postimees called Ukraina Päevik. The amount of people in 
Ukraine, especially in Crimea who are not happy with their economical and democratic 
circumstances is substantial. By no means, does this give another state the right to occupy 
parts of another nation by international law; all this shows is that there has to be something 
“brewing” inside the area that makes such a move possible. And that is exactly what was 
happening in Crimea and other parts that Russia has invaded. The only option for 
employment in Lugansk and Donetsk in particular was to work in factories which made it 
very easy for factory owners to manipulate with their salaries. Eastern Ukraine has been a 
significant industrial centre for this nation. Such was also the case with Crimea but with the 
minor addition of the tourism sector. It is thus understandable why Russia saw the 
opportunity and chose these areas to invade. Steel industries in Crimea, are said to be one 
of the reasons for annexation. It creates some confusion though what they hoped to gain 
economically by invading these areas because the amount of funds they have to put into 
Crimea - which is now a “republic” according to Russia - is substantially larger than what 
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they would hope to gain from it. With China selling steel for a very cheap price, the 
Russians will hardly benefit financially from these factories. Additionally, they cannot sell 
the produce from Crimea in large parts of the world because of sanctions the western 
countries have put on Russia and on the areas occupied. (RFE/RL; 11.2014; RFE/RL; 
10.2014; Taro, 2013-2015) 
Another issue that has to be taken into account is NATO enlargement in Europe which has 
made Russia anxious and look for ways to gain influence herself or to at least show that 
they are a very able military force that will not be controlled by NATO or the west. When 
Ukraine was starting to lean closer to Europe and looking for ways to become part of the 
EU it is not a far-fetched idea that Russia started to feel more and more militarily 
threatened by the west, especially with Turkey already a member of NATO. The way 
Russia invaded Ukraine in order to “help” restore peace in the country that was protesting 
against its Russian-controlled president already shows that Russia was just waiting for an 
opportunity to invade. Yanukovych who gave Russian troops permission to enter Ukraine 
was no longer the president as he is in exile in Russia and a Russian citizen. (RFE/RL; 10. 
2014) The way the western nations have reacted to Russia’s activity in Ukraine is not 
exactly discouraging. Yes there are sanctions, yes there is disapproval but Ukraine has 
received no real and influential military help from the outside because it is not a part of 
NATO. As Igor Taro has speculated in his blog, it makes one wonder when exactly will the 
west really react to Russia’s actions- what does Russia have to do? The sanctions against 
Russia have proven effective: the currency crisis in Russia was a very good example of 
that, the fact that France is still refused to finalise the sale of mistral warships to Russia is 
another, the fact that Russia got kicked out of the G20 also comes to mind. Russia has no 
credibility in the world because of western countries’ actions. (Taro, I2013-2015; Umland, 
2014; RFE/RL; 11.2014) 
The time span of the case study conducted on the Ukraine crisis is from November 2013-
March 2016. This interval allowed to observe the crisis from the beginning, which for this 
writer is the occurrence when then president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych suspended 
preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union 
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and sought closer ties to Russia. Following radical protests from pro-Western groups, 
Yanukovych stepped down and fled to Russia. Moscow responded to the pro- Western 
aspirations in Ukraine by annexing the Crimea in March 2014, sparking wide-ranging EU 
sanctions on Russia and the annexed areas in Ukraine by the West. (Bentzen, N. and 
Anosovs, 2015) The end date for this case is the most recent date possible in order to allow 
feasible time to finish this dissertation. As seen in the previous chapter, these seven clauses 
in Article 42 were used in creating the indicators that show the development of Germany’s 
power on EU level decision-making when it comes to the policies connected to the security 
crisis. Endorsement of the policies or the stance of Germany on this particular case or 
occurrence can be seen from the documents analysed and that is the reason for the writers’ 
interest in them. Every time an indicator was present in the document they were marked 
with an x in a table which can be seen in the Appendix 2. It was possible that both the 
national and the EU level of debate were existent in the document. Altogether over 230 
documents present in English on the German Federal Government website were analysed. 
The indicators based on the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union 
were numbered and the results of the analysis of the documents are presented in table 2.  
Number of 
indicator 
Indicator 
1 common security and defence policy is an integral part of the 
common foreign and security policy (statements and policies 
towards/about the situation in Ukraine; changes in policies because 
of the situation in Ukraine) 
2 the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive 
framing of a common Union defence policy (common defence policy 
against Russia’s aggression) 
3 member states shall make civilian and military capabilities available 
to the Union for the implementation of the common security and 
defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council 
(what are the objectives? Willingness to contribute military means. 
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(for securing border members against potential aggression)) 
4 decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, 
including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, 
shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy or an initiative from Member State (initiatives 
taken/decisions made) 
5 the Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union 
framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the 
Union's values and serve its interests (participation in execution of 
tasks/ defining of interests) 
6 those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria 
and which have made more binding commitments to one another in 
this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish 
permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework 
(readiness to cooperate; level of military capabilities (shows 
Germany’s diversity and readiness in participating in policy 
enforcement- which policies count?) 
7 if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, 
the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid 
and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (attention to potential 
enforcement of this policy) 
Table 1. (Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union; 2012) 
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Table 2 
Findings 
When looking at the first indicator and the times it was located in the documents analysed, 
the gap between it and the other six is substantial. The common security and defence policy 
is an integral part of the common foreign and security policy (statements and policies 
towards/about the situation in Ukraine; changes in policies because of the situation in 
Ukraine) indicator was the most popular by far from the seven signs chosen to assess the 
development of Germany’s power in EU level decision-making. In the speeches and 
government releases that were found on the website, it soon became evident that there was 
a common theme within all the documents under scrutiny. Every effort was made by 
Germany to highlight the fact that military means are not an option to resolve the conflict in 
Ukraine. Promotion of unity was also very clear on both levels. Very often the idea that if 
Germany is strong then Europe is strong and vice versa was stressed. “The continued 
European unification is one of the most important tasks facing the grand coalition during 
this legislative period. Together the CDU/CSU and the SPD aim to shape Germany’s future 
Indicator 1 Indicator 2 Indicator 3 Indicator 4 Indicator 5 Indicator6 Indicator 7 
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and to play an active part in shaping Europe’s future.” Merkel continued to make her point 
in saying that: “At the European Council meeting scheduled for 19 and 20 December 
progress must be made on the common security and defense policy,” in a speech given to 
the Federal Government after her re-election in 2013. (Merkel, 18.03.2013) Stressing the 
implementation of diplomatic means for a peaceful solution of the crisis in Ukraine was the 
main message of Germany and soon became also the one that the EU was promoting as a 
way of solving the crisis in Ukraine. 
Even though no one wished to enter into a military conflict with Russia over Ukraine in the 
EU, the idea of sanctions and implementation of them seemed to be headed by Germany 
and accepted on the EU level. “Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier underlined the 
fact that there can be no military solutions in the Ukraine crisis. The focus is on de-
escalation and conflict resolution, which also means that the EU and Russia must talk 
frankly and openly about their divergent interests or even irreconcilable differences,” was 
written in one of the government statements analyzed. When conducting research on the 
documents that were found on the government website the leaders in Germany did not seem 
to differentiate between Germany’s political position as a nation and the EU-s position as a 
different entity. In many cases the two separate bodies in reality meant the same thing. For 
example, in the previous extract the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
speaks about Germany and its policy on the Ukraine crisis. But when addressing bilateral 
negotiations with Russia, what he states is the EU instead of Germany should do the 
talking. He still means Germany. Naming the union just has a bigger leverage connected to 
its name. Angela Merkel did the same thing when addressing the German Bundestag: 
“...The situation in Ukraine still poses one of the greatest foreign and security policy 
challenges at this time,” said the Chancellor adding that: “At this time of difficult, extremely 
difficult, foreign and security policy challenges for the European Union, there is still a 
special focus on the situation in Ukraine.” (Merkel, 15.10.2015) She again speaks not for 
Germany but for the EU as a whole. There seems to be no difference between the goals of 
the EU and Germany, the way Merkel approaches the problem, she speaks for both, the 
European Union and Germany. The growing influence of Germany within the EU has not 
42 
 
gone unnoticed by outside heads of state. A statement made by the Ukrainian president 
Poroshenko said when thanking the Chancellor and Germany, "…Ukraine’s great friend 
and reliable partner, for the constant support. This is very important especially in terms of 
humanitarian support in rebuilding infrastructure in the Donbas and overcoming the 
economic crisis caused by the war. Thanks to the concrete assistance provided, Germany 
has been not only a reliable bilateral partner, but also a leader within the European 
Union…" (Poroshenko, 13.05.2015) Leaders share the conviction that improved 
cooperation between the EU, Ukraine and Russia will be beneficial to the crisis settlement. 
To this end, they endorse the continuation of trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and 
Russia on conflict resolution.  
Conflict resolution leads this chapter not to the second, but to the fifth indicator. The 
Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of 
Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests (participation in 
execution of tasks/ defining of interests). In order to best resolve the Ukraine crisis a 
number of groups have been formed within the EU. To this end, an oversight mechanism 
agreed to establish in the Normandy format, is one that was mentioned most often which 
convenes at regular intervals, in principle on the level of senior officials from the foreign 
ministries. Merkel again speaks not for Germany but for the EU as a whole: "We will 
continue to work for the implementation of the Minsk agreements – along with France as 
part of the Normandy group, and in close consultation with our European and transatlantic 
partners." (Merkel, 15.10.2015) The Normandy group consisting of France and Germany 
of the EU members has been of crucial value in establishing negotiations between the 
Ukraine conflict parties, additionally, pushing Germany into the centre limelight of 
decision-making in Europe. The European Council supports the initiative of Angela Merkel 
and François Hollande to push ahead with the peace process, which shows that the policies 
made by France and Germany on national level again become the policies of the EU. It is 
not only the Normandy group that shows Germany’s special connection to the Ukraine 
crisis. Germany plays an even more active part in the conflict resolution in Ukraine by 
accepting more responsibility in the OSCE and by the OSCE chairmanship in 2016. (The 
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Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 01.10.2014) Germany’s 
participation also connects with the sixth indicator- those Member States whose military 
capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one 
another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent 
structured cooperation within the Union framework (readiness to cooperate; level of 
military capabilities (shows Germany’s diversity and readiness in participating in policy 
enforcement- which policies count?). As Chancellor Merkel stated in a speech made to the 
Bundestag: “No European country can master the current challenges alone…. Germany in 
particular has a special responsibility to ensure that Europe sticks together,” she said. 
(Merkel, 15.10.2015) 
The second indicator, the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive 
framing of a common Union defence policy (common defence policy against Russia’s 
aggression) refers to the Minsk Protocol signed in September 2014. The Minsk Protocol 
has become central in the EU policy towards the Ukraine crisis and thus acts together with 
the sanctions implemented on Russia as the non-military defence policy against Russia’s 
aggression. The "imperative cornerstone of Minsk" in the words of the Chancellor is “...the 
complete withdrawal of all troops and mercenaries currently unlawfully in Ukraine, as well 
as ensuring full Ukrainian control over the country’s own borders. Our goal is and will 
remain the restoration of free self-determination of Ukraine as regards its territorial 
integrity," stressed Angela Merkel in a speech before the German Bundestag. (Merkel, 
15.10.2015) From the documents studied, it is clear that since the signing of the Minsk 
agreement, the fulfilment of the points agreed upon there is crucial for Germany and 
subsequently for the EU as well. Germany together with France has been the thriving force 
in getting all interested sides to fulfil the agreement. Ever since the influx of refugees 
became uncontrollable, the crisis in Crimea seems to have become less of a priority for 
Germany. The Minsk agreement is still very much mentioned though, but now it seems 
more of an excuse as to why it is impossible to take further steps in resolving the crisis 
rather than an actual way for resolution.  
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The third indicator, member states shall make civilian and military capabilities available to 
the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute 
to the objectives defined by the Council (what are the objectives? Willingness to contribute 
military means (for securing border members against potential aggression)) evaluates the 
level of participation of Germany in the resolution of the conflict. Germany has made 
numerous attempts both on national and supranational level to appease the conflict in 
Ukraine. As part of the OSCE, the federation has provided the conflict areas with peace 
troops and observers. On the supranational level Germany as the OSCE chairman made the 
Ukraine crisis as one of the organisations’ priorities. Germany’s objective is to find a 
peaceful solution to the crisis in Crimea and the same aim has been mentioned on numerous 
occasions on the EU level as well. The Minsk agreement is the document on which the EU 
and Germany refer to when dealing with the crisis but at the same time, additional measures 
in the form of further sanctions are not dismissed.  "If things go well, we will be happy to 
support this process. If there are difficulties we cannot discount the option of additional 
sanctions," German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in a statement given during a G7 
nations meeting in 2014 if the ceasefire is not respected in Ukraine. Initiative was taken 
again by Germany to speak for the whole of EU. The federation along with France seem to 
have been entrusted to represent the whole of Europe. (Statement of G7 leaders on Ukraine; 
12.03.2014)  
On 22 of June, it can be seen from the documents analysed that the German stance on the 
resolution of the conflict and the appropriate means to reach the solutions once again 
became the official policy of the union: “....On Monday the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council 
extended economic sanctions on Russia for another six months. This implements a decision 
taken by the European Council in March. The aim of these steps is still to achieve peace 
and security for Ukraine.” (The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 
22.06.2015) The document further reads that the sanctions were agreed upon with the 
support of all the EU member states which is curios as the sanctions put on Russia have 
seriously harmed the economic welfare of some of the EU members whose export income 
largely depends on Russia. The fourth indicator, decisions relating to the common security 
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and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall 
be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from Member State 
(initiatives taken/decisions made) largely connects with the third indicator mentioned above 
with the further addition of the projection of German values in the EU decision-making. It 
can be seen from the policies that it is not only the economic benefits that matter to 
Germany and thus the EU as in this case the whole conflict in Ukraine could be dismissed 
as of no importance to the west. The economic sanctions somewhat confirm the supremacy 
of German decisions in the EU. As mentioned before and as Merkel has stated, it is only 
with peaceful means that Germany and the EU see possible the crisis in Ukraine can be 
solved. The possibility of further sanctions and the extension of them were always seen as a 
possibility. And the sanctions were extended in June, 2015 even though some of the eastern 
members of the EU would have preferred of largely benefitted from the opposite. The 
conflict of Ukraine was in many documents referred to as an effort to destroy the European 
values on which Merkel has relied on and of which peace and protection of human right is 
central. 
The seventh indicator, if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, 
the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
(attention to potential enforcement of this policy) refers to the members nations readiness to 
defend on another in case of a conflict. It does not however contradict NATO or a nations’ 
membership in it, rather it seeks to cooperate with NATO, get members to put more effort 
into preparation to defend themselves and the ability for Europe to provide security for 
themselves without the help of the United States. When analysing Germany’s projection of 
influence, the initiative to defend the eastern members of the EU under NATO in case of a 
potential conflict was of key value. Cooperation with NATO or under it was often 
highlighted in the documents and called for by Germany. In the NATO summit in Wales in 
2014 the central document was the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). “...It provides for short-
term effective measures being continued beyond 2014 for purposes of assurance. These 
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involve primarily enhancing NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, air policing in the Baltic, 
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance flights in the Eastern NATO 
states and the "ongoing presence" of NATO troops in Eastern member states in the form of 
more frequent exercises.” (The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 
22.06.2015) which support the findings presented in this chapter. Another measure 
proposed by Germany to ensure the security of the member states is the European Energy 
Union for an independent energy supply from Russia: “...One central aspect of the Energy 
Union will be ensuring secure and reliable supplies. This is an aspect we have become 
more aware of as a result of developments in Ukraine,” The Press and Information Office 
of the Federal Government, 19.03.2015) Merkel said in a speech which again relies on the 
European values. The use of this term has become notably more frequent since the 
beginning of the three crises, especially when it comes to Merkel and her speeches and 
statements. It seems that she is looking for something to unite or even to keep united the 
people of the EU when there is so much that can easily tear this experiment of a union 
apart.  
Conclusion 
To conclude the security case study chapter of this thesis, it is important to highlight some 
of the findings presented here and to stress the importance of the Ukraine crisis and the 
implication it has had on the notion of security in the European Union and Germany’s role 
in creating an EU-level policy towards it. With terrorism looming deep inside the EU and 
with no visible solution offered to this threat to the European way of life the Ukraine crisis 
seems to have taken a secondary seat in the “important issues list”. But it s vital to note that 
terrorism has not had such a groundbreaking influence on the European Union and never 
will as the threat of terrorism does not come from an enemy who is at the same time a 
neighbour. Russia is a tangible threat that endangers the whole idea of Europe- something 
that terrorism will never be able to do. The security crisis that became evident with the 
annexation of Crimea is that one nation threatens the sovereignty and self-determination of 
other nations, also something that terrorism has not done. Terrorism is internal-the security 
crisis stemmed from Ukraine is external. The economic sanctions somewhat confirm the 
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supremacy of German decisions in the EU. The possibility of further sanctions and the 
extension of them were always seen as a feasible option. And the sanctions were extended 
in June, 2015 even though some of the eastern members of the EU would have preferred or 
largely benefitted from the opposite. What Germany has pressed on- and subsequently the 
whole of the European Union- is that there can only be a peaceful solution to the crisis. The 
Minsk agreement is the founding document for this solution but as can be seen from the 
analysis, it has become more of an excuse for the EU not to deal with the issue. It appeared 
that every time the Ukrainian subject was approached the Minsk agreement was mentioned 
instead of actual solutions that would offer some progress to the stale standoff. The frozen 
situation in Ukraine does not however mean that Germany will stop lobbying for closer 
military cooperation between the EU members  
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Eurozone crisis  
The time span of the case study conducted on the Eurozone crisis is from October 2009-
March 2016. This interval allowed the author to observe the crisis from the beginning, 
which for this chapter is the occurrence when the global financial crisis, which started in 
the United States in 2007, spread to Europe in 2009. It especially hit Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece, and Spain, countries which have introduced the single currency, the euro. The 
effects of the global financial crisis became evident in Europe throughout the course of 
2008. (Patomäki, H., 2013) These Eurozone countries no longer have monetary policy 
autonomy, so they do not have the option of devaluation to increase competitiveness. The 
crisis has shown that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created in 1993, and 
which led to the single currency in 1999, is faulty. (Laursen, F. 2013) 
Despite the before mentioned and other emergency measures, Europe’s economy sank into 
deep recession, and the GDP of the Eurozone dropped by over 4 percent in 2009. 
(Patomäki, H., 2013) Through the crisis its debt levels rose rapidly from 115 to 143 percent 
of GDP. There were rescue packages devised by the EU and the International Monetary 
Fund for Greece and other countries who were not coping with their national debt. 
Countries intent on EMU membership were required to achieve low inflation rates, low 
public spending deficits and low levels of debt, and convergence of their long-term interest 
rates with those of German state-issued bonds. A stable and market-friendly framework 
was meant to guarantee convergence of economic situations. Practically no attention was 
paid to the demand side when the EMU system was created. Economic union was 
embarked upon on the hegemony of supply-side economic theories and recommendations, 
such as the freedom of movement of capital, the goal of low inflation, lower taxes, and the 
establishment of an independent central bank. The Eurozone’s problem has not been sector-
specific changes in demand, but rather persistent trade imbalances and their cumulative 
effects. (Patomäki, H., 2013) 
EMU (Economic Monetary Union) 
The European Monetary Union (EMU), currently governing 22 European countries, has 
been in existence since 1999. After a relatively smooth start it was hit hard after the 
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financial crisis of 2007, as were most other economies. However, unlike in the United 
States, the crisis only became worse in 2009- 2010 with the Euro-debt crisis and to this day 
Europe still struggles with high unemployment and low GDP growth. (Caratelli, 2015) 
Known as the Werner Plan, this proposal included a road map for the creation of a 
monetary union over a period of ten years. It comprised a three-stage design for closer 
cooperation on economic policy matters the liberalization of capital movements, and 
measures to combat structural differences between the participating countries. Despite the 
strong initial support that it enjoyed in Germany and France, the Werner Plan was soon 
shelved. (Fichtner and König, 2015; Streeck and Elsässer, 2016) The creation of a Single 
Market as part of the Single European Act brought the removal of capital controls in its 
wake; but it unleashed economic centrifugal forces that required the reorganization of 
European monetary and currency arrangements. (Fichtner and König, 2015) 
“In December 1991, the Maastricht Treaty, which set forth the criteria for the intended pre-
monetary-union economic convergence and defined a fixed timetable for the introduction 
of the monetary union, was ratified: after the removal of capital controls in the first stage of 
the process, the second stage- which included the establishment of the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) as a pre-step to the ECB- was set to begin on January 1, 1994; the third 
stage- the final and irrevocable fixation of exchange rates and the introduction of the single 
currency- was to have been completed by January 1, 1999 at the latest.” (Fichtner and 
König, 2015, pp378)  
These arguments were reasonable enough to persuade governments that the implementation 
of euro was a powerful tool for strengthening cooperation between member states. But the 
intensity of integration inside the EMU turned out to be weaker than expected. During the 
first eight years after completing the third stage of introducing the common currency, the 
new monetary policy proved to be able to control the inflation level as long as the economic 
situation was relatively favourable. Financial market integration was also enhanced, 
although economic and political integration was not strengthened as expected and thus the 
developmental gap between member states was shrinking slowly. At the same time, new 
countries fulfilling the convergence criteria were entering the monetary union and 
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loosening their financial discipline once they were able to issue the euro. (Fichtner and 
König, 2015; Streeck and Elsässer, 2016, Becker, 2013) 
Initially, monetary integration in the euro area was a success in economic terms. In the 
medium term, the European Central Bank was largely able to maintain its target rate of 
inflation of close to but below two percent. The monetary union also resulted in deeper 
goods and capital market integration, as well as a marked convergence of interest rates on 
public and private debt. As a result of these developments, in the years immediately after 
the introduction of the common currency until the onset of the global financial crisis in 
2007, many member states experienced a stronger economic development than in the 
previous decade. (Fichtner and König, 2015; Streeck and Elsässer, 2016) At the heart of the 
EMU’s economic problems are gaps in its structure and issues that were ignored or not 
fully considered when the EMU took effect in 1999. The principal requirement that 
Member States wanting to join the EMU had to meet was a budget deficit of 3 percent per 
year or less.3 Germany was profoundly influential in the process leading up to EMU. 
(Robbins, 2015, pp 176) 
It must be noted that there is one more weakness of the EMU that was neither discussed nor 
considered before the establishment of a common currency- public dissatisfaction with the 
introduction of euro. While the consequences of this phenomenon cannot be measured, it is 
clear that the public disapproval for further integration has its political consequences and 
acts to the detriment of integration inside the European Union. (Zielinska, 2016) 
Greece 
Greece is in the midst of a devastating economic and financial crisis that the European 
Union has been trying ardently to resolve since the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008. 
The European Union has consistently used the existing treaty articles and legislation within 
its competence to impose traditional and homogenized austerity measures on highly 
indebted Member States, most notably Greece. The EU- imposed austerity measures always 
consist of the same basic principles: raising taxes, cutting government spending, and paying 
down sovereign debt. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, several Member 
States were able to reduce their deficit ratios dramatically. Greece experienced one of the 
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largest drops in deficit, as between 1992 and the time it was approved for the EMU in 2000, 
it had decreased its deficit by 10 percent. The shocking 10 percent figure can be attributed 
to intense short-term deficit reduction strategies by Greece in an effort to meet the 3 percent 
target as well as to dishonest bookkeeping. (Robbins, 2015, pp p 177) Greece became the 
centre of Europe’s debt crisis after Wall Street imploded in 2008. With global financial 
markets still reeling, Greece announced in October 2009 that it had been understating its 
deficit figures for years, raising alarms about the soundness of Greek finances. Since the 
beginning of the crisis and after receiving three bailouts in five years and accepting a series 
of austerity measures, Greece needs new aid to make a July, 2016 debt payment and to 
avoid defaulting on its debt. The terms of the most recent bailout, from last summer, 
include commitments by Athens to put in place budget cuts and economic overhauls. Greek 
lawmakers approved those measures, which covered several of the changes sought by the 
country’s international creditors, last year. They included rising the retirement age, cutting 
pensions, liberalizing the energy market expanding a property tax that Greeks already 
despise, and pushing forward a stalled program to privatise state assets. (The New York 
Times, 2016) 
The end date for this case is the most recent date possible in order to allow feasible time to 
finish this dissertation. As seen in the previous chapter, these five clauses from the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union were used in creating the 
indicators that show the development of Germany’s power on EU level decision-making 
when it comes to the policies connected to the Eurozone crisis. Endorsement of the policies 
or the stance of Germany on this particular case or occurrence can be seen from the 
documents analysed and that is the reason for the writers’ interest in them. Every time an 
indicator was present in the document they were marked with an x in a table which can be 
seen in the Appendix 3. It was possible that both the national and the EU level of debate 
were existent in the document. Altogether over 230 documents present in English on the 
German Federal Government website were analysed. The indicators based on the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union were numbered and the results 
of the analysis of the documents are presented in table 4. 
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Number of 
indicator 
Indicator 
1 Minimum reserves: ECB may require credit institutions established in 
Member States to hold minimum reserve on accounts with the ECB 
and national central banks in pursuance of monetary policy objectives. 
Regulations concerning the calculation and determination of the 
required minimum reserves may be established by the Governing 
Council. In cases of noncompliance the ECB shall be entitled to levy 
penalty interest and to impose other sanctions with comparable effect. 
(How does Germany’s vision of minimum reserves comply with the 
Council’s vision) 
2 Sanctions: The Council shall, in accordance with the procedure laid 
down in Article 41, define the basis for minimum reserves and the 
maximum permissible ratios between those reserves and their basis, as 
well as the appropriate sanctions in cases of 
noncompliance.(Germany’s vision of penalties or noncompliance 
sanctions- attention to potential enforcement of this policy; the 
proposed necessity for punishment) 
3 The Governing Council may, by a majority of two thirds of the votes 
cast, decide upon the use of such other operational methods of 
monetary control as it sees fit, respecting Article 2. The Council shall, 
in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 41, define the 
scope of such methods if they impose obligations on third parties. 
(Germany’s offered methods to dealing with the Greek crisis and the 
methods and used so far) 
4 The ECB shall: 
— make recommendations and deliver opinions. (How much of the 
delivered decisions, recommendations and regulations collide with 
Germany’s national policy) 
53 
 
5 The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential 
State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In 
particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State. (Germany’s policies in ensuring the safeguarding of 
this Article vs supranational policies when researching the Eurozone 
crisis) 
Table 3 (Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union; 2012) 
 
Table 4 
Findings 
When looking at the first indicator: minimum reserves: ECB may require credit institutions 
established in Member States to hold minimum reserve on accounts with the ECB and 
Indicator 1 Indicator 2 Indicator 3 Indicator 4 Indicator 5 
National 35 13 21 79 9 
EU 22 13 22 77 11 
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national central banks in pursuance of monetary policy objectives. Regulations concerning 
the calculation and determination of the required minimum reserves may be established by 
the Governing Council. In cases of noncompliance the ECB shall be entitled to levy penalty 
interest and to impose other sanctions with comparable effect. (How does Germany’s 
vision of minimum reserves comply with the Council’s vision), what emerges from the 
documents analysed is how actively Germany has promoted frugal national monetary 
policy and closer cooperation with the European Central Bank (ECB) instead of each 
Eurozone nation having its own fiscal agenda. In a Council meeting on the 18
th
 of 
December, 2013 a federal statement about Merkel’s action plan to combat the crisis 
concluded: “....in spite of all progress, we have not yet completely weathered the crisis. It is 
vital to tackle the root causes of the crisis, she said. There must be no repetition. She cited 
the high level of national debt in many EU member states, the lack of competitiveness, and 
undesirable developments in the financial sector as some of these root causes. To 
implement the necessary reforms in member countries, the Chancellor once again 
advocated binding agreements between member states and the European Commission. 
These would have to be approved by the national parliaments. In exchange the countries 
would receive material support. Angela Merkel also endorsed modifying the European 
treaties in order to remedy the errors and omissions of the last twenty years. This is the 
only way, she said, to ensure greater competencies for Europe.” (The Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government, 18.12.2013) This document is one of many 
such examples and it appears that with the Eurozone crisis Germany finally accepted its 
role as the leader of the EU. A document produced in 2013 which was financed by the 
German government but included many international experts stated: “....today, however, 
this stance has become less appropriate as Germany’s economic influence in Europe has 
grown so great. Many other countries in Europe are now ready and willing for Germany to 
play a larger role, but Germany has yet to create a political role for itself in Europe that 
meets this need and is commensurate with its economic power.” (The Press and Information 
Office of the Federal Government, 2013) 
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On 12th of July, 2015 the heads of state and government of the euro countries had agreed 
with Greece on a third bailout. The Greek government submitted a corresponding request to 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). According to the rescue programme, the country 
would receive loans totalling between 82 and 86 billion Euros over the next three years. 
The aid programme is associated with numerous and far-reaching reform requirements of 
the Greek state and economy. The Greek government was reluctant to make the reform the 
EU, especially the Eurozone countries requested in order to grant Greece the bailout money 
the needed to survive. As was the case with the frugal economic principles, the German 
presence was omnipresent when the Greek bailout plan was drafted. Germany also stated 
that they would make sure the requirements for the getting funds would be fulfilled: “...Of 
course, we must nonetheless remain cautious, because the sums which we are making 
available are significant, Schäuble admitted. He stressed that the implementation would be 
monitored very closely, step by step, following the experience gained in recent years. 
Before the start of the meeting Schäuble had called for participation of the International 
Monetary Fund in the aid package for Greece. We must see if we have a clear commitment 
from the International Monetary Fund, if possible a binding IMF commitment, he said, 
adding that it was also important that the results of the July 12 summit be implemented.” 
(The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 15.08.2015) 
The second indicator: Sanctions: The Council shall, in accordance with the procedure laid 
down in Article 41 (see Appendix 1), define the basis for minimum reserves and the 
maximum permissible ratios between those reserves and their basis, as well as the 
appropriate sanctions in cases of noncompliance (Germany’s vision of penalties or 
noncompliance sanctions- attention to potential enforcement of this policy; the proposed 
necessity for punishment) is directly connected to the third indicator: the Governing 
Council may, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, decide upon the use of such other 
operational methods of monetary control as it sees fit, respecting Article 2. The Council 
shall, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 41(see Appendix 1), define the 
scope of such methods if they impose obligations on third parties. (Germany’s offered 
methods to dealing with the Greek crisis and the methods and used so far) as they are both 
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set forth direct control mechanisms over national finances and budgets. In 2013 the German 
government announced that: “the introduction of EU-wide banking supervision has been 
agreed, and the regulations for winding up banks are on track. It must be ensured that tax-
payers are not presented with the bill when banks fail. (The Press and Information Office 
of the Federal Government, 18.12.2013) When analysing the documents for this thesis, 
especially for the Euro crisis chapter, it became evident from the beginning of the timeline 
that stronger control over national level banking was what Germany wished and lobbied for 
and this is what was decided on the EU-level. This again proves Germany’s strong 
influence on the EU level. In some ways this is not anything surprising as Germany is the 
biggest economy in Europe. Germany also has the biggest financial reserves in Europe and 
has been an avid supporter of making it an EU level policy, that all nations should abstain 
from large national debt and have a reserve for times of crisis.  
The fourth indicator: The ECB shall make recommendations and deliver opinions. (How 
much of the delivered decisions, recommendations and regulations collide with Germany’s 
national policy), was notably the one with the biggest presence in the documents 
researched. It is no wonder as the indicator itself is one of making recommendations and 
expressing opinion. What made it important was that in Germany’s case recommendations 
and opinions to other nations have become urges for action, especially with Greece. A good 
example of it is: “Before the meeting Chancellor Angela Merkel had said that she was 
looking forward to meeting Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras for the first time. She 
believes that a compromise can be found regarding Greece’s debt. Europe always aims to 
broker compromises, she said, but the benefits must outweigh the disadvantages. For 
Europe’s credibility it is also essential, continued Angela Merkel, that we respect the 
rules.” (Merkel, 13.02.2015) Tsipras who was very much against the proposed reforms saw 
them as a punishment for the difficulties the Eurozone is facing because of the Greek 
economic crisis and did not want to accept them. Germany was not willing to make 
amendments and in the end Greece had to do what they were told in order to receive the 
bailout money. So in the end, there was no compromise, it was the German way and an 
order to follow the rules. This leads to the fifth and the final indicator: the Union shall 
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respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, 
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole 
responsibility of each Member State. (Germany’s policies in ensuring the safeguarding of 
this Article versus supranational policies when researching the Eurozone crisis)  
Throughout the research which was conducted on the documents that are connected to the 
Eurozone crisis, it seemed that Greece expected some kind of a special treatment or thought 
that no matter what the EU would bail them out. Germany since the beginning was against 
this kind of bailout and this was also the policy of the EU- the rules need to be the same for 
all members, was the standpoint presented by Germany and the EU: “Ahead of the 
Bundestag vote on further aid for Greece, Merkel argued in favour of debt relief measures. 
She said she was confident that the Bundestag would approve the third rescue package on 
Wednesday. The Greek government has worked quite differently than in the previous 
months; it is now fulfilling the reform requirements formulated by the international 
creditors as conditions for new loans. Merkel rejected any trimming of Greece’s debt. 
Within the Eurozone there can be no haircut, she said. However, there is still leeway on the 
extension of maturities, on interest rates, she specified. “We will do everything to ensure 
that Greece now quickly returns to growth,” declared Merkel. It is important for the 
Federal Government that the conditions cannot be modified according to who is governing 
a country. The conditions are now the same for all countries concerned. “And I think that 
was very important to strengthen the euro,” said the Chancellor.” (The Press and 
Information Office of the Federal Government, 16.08.2015) The general portrayed message 
from the German government and especially Merkel has been that Greece will not be left 
alone and the responsibility will be shared. Additionally, while Merkel has been rather 
diplomatic in her approach to Greece, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s 
attitude towards Greece’s willingness to reform their nation has been more strict and rigid.  
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Conclusion  
The ECB was founded mostly according to German desires to have an ECB which mirrored 
closely the powers and status of the Bundesbank. Like the Bundesbank, the ECB does not 
have to coordinate its price stability or inflation targets with the Member States, and so by 
design, the short-term interests of certain Member States, or even the EU institutions, 
cannot sway the ECB. (Robbins, 2015, pp186) In a way it could be said then that Alexis 
Tsipras was correct in blaming the EU and moreover the “strict” and “hard-handed” 
Germans in their debt crisis. Germany however has not bent the rules to accommodate the 
Greek government and thus either has the EU or the ECB. As Merkel said: “The conditions 
are now the same for all countries concerned,” adding that: “I think that was very 
important to strengthen the euro.” (The Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, 16.08.2015) Germany has fought hard to keep the EU together and prevent 
the collapse of the Eurozone, from the documents that were analysed for this chapter that 
was the message which was present most.  
The crisis in Greece is also important as it seems to be the point where Germany finally 
accepts its leading role in Europe. With the Ukraine crisis-or the security crisis- Germany 
preferred to lean on France and seemed to highlight cooperation with some other EU 
member. This was not the case with the Eurozone crisis. Germany took control over 
negotiations and lobbied for closer control over the financial matters of the Eurozone 
members and was very strict in not alleviating the financial responsibilities of Greece.  
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Refugee crisis 
The time span of the case study conducted on the refugee crisis is from January 2014- 
March 2016. This interval allowed to observe the crisis from the beginning, which for this 
writer is the occurrence when a very high number of refugees started to pour in from Syria 
but also from other middle eastern and African countries to flee from war and terror. 
Currently, the spotlight is focused on Syria, where half of the population is displaced (at 
least 11 million people). However, we cannot forget the other global hotspots: Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa. This part of Africa has a population of 1,000 million 
people and the highest fertility rate in the world. The region is marred not only by bloody 
conflicts but also by soaring temperatures and droughts which means starvation and a lack 
of drinking water. (Baldacchino and Sammut, 2016) 
According to IOM data, more than 900,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers arrived 
in the European Union through the Mediterranean in 2015, almost entirely via the Eastern 
and Central Mediterranean routes to Greece and Italy. The number of deaths- more than 
3,500 in 2015- exceeds the previous years’ record death toll. And it is not known how 
many additional deaths go unreported. Even when estimates of the missing are available 
following shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, bodies are often not found. We should also not 
forget that many migrants die en route to Europe in Africa and the Middle East. In mid-
June, the bodies of 48 migrants were found decaying in the desert between Niger and 
Algeria. A neglected dimension of the situation in the Mediterranean is the ramifications 
for the families of those who die, particularly when the body is never found or there is no 
identification of the dead. Not only do families experience what has been called 
‘ambiguous loss’ but a person going missing can affect family dynamics and social 
relations, the family’s economic situation, and processes like inheritance, remarriage and 
guardianship of children. (Swing, 2016) 
Starting with the 2013 Lampedusa shipwreck that cost the lives of more than 500 migrants 
en route for Italy, the Mediterranean soon started counting the loss of lives in thousands. 
The main turning point for the European Union came after the media outburst following the 
19 April 2015 tragedy, when a migrant boat sank just off Libya resulting in more than 800 
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dead men, women and children. According to IMO, early 2015 witnessed a 1,600% 
increase in the number of migrants drowning while attempting to cross the Mediterranean 
as compared to the same period in early 2014. (Selanec, 2015) 
One of the principal reasons that refugees are willing to take on the severe risks associated 
with making the journey to Europe is the lack of adequate support being provided by the 
international community in locations of displacement. As the Syrian refugee crisis 
illustrates, the more protracted the situation becomes, the less support there is available, 
leaving host states and refugees to struggle on alone. (bin Talal, H., 2016) Ironically, the 
world is currently experiencing the biggest wave of refugees since World War II, just as the 
70th anniversary of the end of that war and the setting up of the United Nations have been 
commemorated. Still, some states persevere in criminalising migrants by branding them as 
illegal and alien; and they are eager to deploy various measures of detainment and 
humiliation that give a false sense of legitimacy (and security) to their citizens, when in fact 
such measures expose a deep vulnerability. No human is illegal. (Baldacchino and Sammut, 
2016) 
Three million refugees have been produced by the Syrian war. Six and a half million, or 
one-third, of Syrian people are displaced. Half of these refugees are children. Europe at this 
time is experiencing historical migrations and refugee waves. It is the worst refugee crisis 
since World War II. (Swing, 2016) Germany, driven by an outpouring of public sympathy, 
but also by calculated reasoning that made this country welcome some 800 000 immigrants 
during 2015. The plan is to help them quickly integrate into and contribute to German 
society and economy. Chancellor Angela Merkel has a historic challenge to transform what 
has been dubbed as a refugee crisis beyond proportion into an opportunity. The Syrian 
refugees may prove to be a welcome injection of skill, creativity, and the sheer will to 
survive in a Germany that is currently experiencing the lowest birth rate in Europe. 
(Baldacchino and Sammut, 2016) 
While the high number of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe in 2015 has increased 
pressures and tensions, this is not a crisis beyond the capability of Europe to manage 
together as a Union. We need bold, collective thinking and action to develop a truly 
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comprehensive approach. (Swing, 2016) The most effective policies that the EU can pursue 
will need to focus on the underlying causes of migration to its shores and then addressing 
those causes in the refugees’ countries of origin. (bin Talal, H., 2016) Europe’s neighbours 
to the south and the east are experiencing unprecedented levels of instability, conflict, 
economic collapse and, increasingly, the effects of a changing climate. The war in Syria 
and attendant impacts on the region continue with no end in sight. Turkey, Lebanon and 
Jordan are host to most of the four million Syrians who have fled their homelands. (Swing, 
2016) Most measures taken by the European Union in responding to the refugee crisis 
present nothing more than desperate solutions to the problem s already raging on its 
territory or a t its borders. The remaining measures are simply efforts to prevent the refugee 
crisis reaching the Union territory in the first place. The Union still lacks a coherent and 
systematic approach to crisis management in a timely manner - something that is, 
ironically, well within its legislative and operational capabilities. Instead, political 
particularities of individual Member States now seem to be prevailing, blocking an 
approach of solidarity that ought to be taken by an ever-closer and integrated Union. 
(Selanec, 2015) 
Between 2007 and 2013 the EU allocated almost 2 billion Euros to the security of its 
external borders; it has also spent significant sums of money on migration-related 
initiatives, such as reception and detention centres, in non-EU countries to pre-empt as 
many would-be immigrants as possible. By contrast, only 17% (or 700 million Euros) of 
spending over the same period was used in relation to the resettlement and integration of 
refugees. (bin Talal, H., 2016) A European Council meeting on 23 April 2015 was the first 
to call upon the Commission to respond to the need to undertake coordinated Union action 
to prevent further loss of life at sea by strengthening the presence of naval forces in the 
Mediterranean and fighting human smugglers and traffickers. “The first group of measures 
aims to resolve what was classified as the most pressing duty of saving lives at sea, 
together with protecting the Union borders. The second one encompasses Union efforts in 
the international arena to uphold its international obligations and values. The ultimate 
goal of the second set of measures is yet again to secure the Union external borders, 
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alongside the humanitarian approach. The final group of introduced emergency measures 
aims to repair internally the existing European policy on asylum that has proven to fall 
short faced with the pressure of thousands of migrants.” (Selanec, 2015, pp76) 
Frontex, the European agency responsible for the coordination of Europe’s external border 
management with land, sea, and air operations was put in charge of outside border control. 
In addition to its sea- based joint operations with Italy acting as host member state, Frontex 
coordinates other maritime operations hosted by other EU member states- notably Greece 
and Spain. The joint operation with Greece, Operation Poseidon Sea, involves the 
participation of 23 member states in the eastern Mediterranean to tackle migration flows 
from Turkey across the Aegean Sea. (Miltner, 2015, pp 215) Still, the refugee crisis is not 
only caused by outside factors, but also has become a union level issue because of internal 
ambiguities with policies regarding interstate cooperation. 
The end date for this case is the most recent date possible in order to allow feasible time to 
finish this dissertation. As seen in the previous chapter, these five clauses from the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union were used in creating the 
indicators that show the development of Germany’s power on EU level decision-making 
when it comes to the policies connected to the refugee crisis. Endorsement of the policies or 
the stance of Germany on this particular case or occurrence can be seen from the 
documents analysed and that is the reason for the writers’ interest in them. Every time an 
indicator was present in the document they were marked with an x in a table which can be 
seen in the Appendix 4. It was possible that both the national and the EU level of debate 
were existent in the document. Altogether over 200 documents present in English on the 
German Federal Government website were analysed. The indicators based on the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union were numbered and the results 
of the analysis of the documents are presented in table 6. 
Number of 
indicator 
Indicator 
1 The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
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freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail. (Germany’s policies to 
ensure asylum compared to supranational policies when analysing 
the refugee crisis, changes made in this area during the crisis, policy 
changes on border control) 
2 The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with 
respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime. (Germany’s policies in these 
areas compared to supranational policies, decisions/changes made in 
this area) 
3 The Union shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and 
shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women 
and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights 
of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its 
rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's 
cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. (Germany’s policies 
in these areas compared to supranational policies, decisions/changes 
made in this area) 
4 In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of 
its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the 
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protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as 
well as to the strict observance and the development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. (Germany’s values compared to the EU’s, work done to 
promote and develop the values and beliefs within the EU and 
outside) 
5 The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. 
(Germany’s policies in these areas compared to supranational 
policies, decisions/changes made in this area) 
Table 5 (Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union; 2012) 
 
Table 6 
Indicator 1 Indicator 2 Indicator 3 Indicator 4 Indicator 5 
National 94 56 20 13 10 
EU 78 54 15 11 9 
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Findings 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail. (Germany’s policies to ensure asylum compared to supranational 
policies when analysing the refugee crisis, changes made in this area during the crisis, 
policy changes on border control) Germany has been the frontrunner in accepting refugees 
into their country since the beginning of the massive influx of migrants in 2015. They have 
also run a campaign for equal distribution of refugees between EU members so the pressure 
of hosting them would not fall on only a few of them: “Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed 
the importance of a common European asylum policy. “We agree that the common 
European asylum policy must be enforced. The Commission should identify safe countries 
of origin and set up joint registration centres in Greece and Italy. Migrants who are not 
granted the right to stay should be returned to their home countries, said Angela Merkel. 
There is agreement that, "refugees fleeing wars should be allocated fairly to the various 
EU member states on the basis of the economic strength and performance of each member 
state”. This is a shared position, she said.” (Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, 01.09.2015) This statement serves two purposes: firstly it proves the 
statement made earlier as this standpoint is not an exception, on the contrary, as can be seen 
from table 6 it was mentioned on numerous occasion in the documents studied. Secondly, it 
is interesting to not how Germany changed their policies on refugees and how subsequently 
the policies of the EU changed as well. As was mentioned on the methodology chapter of 
this thesis, the indicators that the research was founded on are articles from the EU Treaty. 
Thus, the policy change in accepting refugees at one point becomes contradictory to the 
articles that the European Union is founded on and on the values Germany has always 
promoted and held high. What has now become the main point of focus is not to help the 
people fleeing from war but to get the number of refugees under control: “The German 
government aims to achieve a tangible and lasting reduction in refugee numbers. Speaking 
in Wildbad Kreuth, Chancellor Angela Merkel said a European solution is needed. Federal 
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Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said in Wildbad Kreuth, that if Germany were also 
forced to close its borders it would not be a German problem, but a European problem. 
Naturally, it would impact on the Schengen system, and thus on European integration, the 
common market and probably also the euro system. Europe must thus act more swiftly to 
find a common solution. “We have a limited amount of time,” said Wolfgang Schäuble.” 
(Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 20.01.2016) 
The second indicator: the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in 
conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, 
immigration and the prevention and combating of crime, (Germany’s policies in these areas 
compared to supranational policies, decisions/changes made in this area) highlights two 
main issues the longevity of Schengen and the security of the EUs citizens. With the 
increasing terror Europe is facing, many government officials- including prime ministers 
from Belgium and France and the president of France- from all over the EU are saying that 
they are at war. On November 13th, 2015, gunmen and suicide bombers hit a concert hall, a 
major stadium, restaurants and bars, almost simultaneously. On March 22nd, 2016, three 
terrorist attacks took place in Brussels- one of them within close proximity of the 
headquarters of the European Union, in an underground station. The second site was at one 
of the biggest airports in Europe- at the Zavantem airport near Brussels. These events took 
place days after the arrest of Salah Abdeslam, the man behind the Paris terrorist attacks. 
The concept of terrorism is not a new one but Europe has been at peace ever since the end 
of WWII. The whole idea behind the creation of the EU was to prevent conflict and to 
promote cooperation and integration. After more than half a century of peace and 
prosperity, governments of state in Europe regard themselves again at war but the enemy is 
different and hard to identify. (Hollande, 2015) The large influx of refugees has not only 
put under question. Whether it is actually connected or not with terrorism, is not going to 
be discussed in this thesis. However, the uncontrollable influx of people fleeing from the 
same terrorist group that has terrorised Europe makes it simple not only for asylum seekers 
but also for extremists to come to Europe unnoticed. Schengen area with its open borders 
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subsequently eases travel between sites. With many nations reinstating their borders to 
control the flow of refugees there is already a lot of pressure between neighbouring EU 
states who will subsequently be left to deal with the mass of migrants on their own.  
This thus connects the third indicator with the fourth one: the Union shall combat social 
exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the 
child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among 
Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure 
that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. (Germany’s policies in these 
areas compared to supranational policies, decisions/changes made in this area) Be it the 
accusation of refugees raping German women, be it the terrorist attacks in Paris or just the 
mere number of them flowing into Europe and the inability to deal with them- it is not 
clear. Quite possibly it is the mixture of all these ingredients has been the reason for the 
changes German policies towards accepting refugees. But along with Germany’s attitude, 
the EU policies changed too. Now the EU is working towards sending the refugees back to 
Turkey- away from Europe- the exact opposite of what they were doing before. And 
Germany is again the leader of this policy and the prime negotiator with turkey to make a 
deal: “In view of the rising numbers of asylum seekers Chancellor Angela Merkel said "We 
are in agreement, however, that a distinction must be made between those who are entitled 
to protection and those who have no such entitlement, and who thus have no prospects of 
remaining in Germany.” (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 
18.06.2015) Turkey leads this chapter not to the fourth but to the fifth indicator: The Union 
shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an 
area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. (Germany’s policies in 
these areas compared to supranational policies, decisions/changes made in this area). 
Turkey has been the main gateway between the EU and the Middle East for refugees to 
reach the intended states: “Turkey has a key role to play. It is our direct neighbour and a 
gateway for irregular migration. Turkey is doing amazing things for more than two million 
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refugees from Syria. But it needs more support from us – to feed and accommodate the 
refugees, to secure borders, and to fight human traffickers. For this very reason, the 
dialogue on migration policy that the European Commission has launched with Turkey is of 
vital importance. Germany will work bilaterally in support of the Commission’s 
endeavours in this regard. Equally important are the efforts to form a government of 
national unity in Libya. Europe supports the efforts undertaken by UN Envoy León.” 
(Merkel, 07.10.2015) 
Germany has been, again, the leader of the negotiations between Turkey and the EU to 
reach to an agreement on how to control the flow of migrants. What Turkey wants out of 
the deal is visa free travel to the EU nations and to reenergise the membership talks. With 
the proposed deal for every refugee sent back to Turkey a refugee would be resettled in an 
EU country. This is however a very controversial deal because as, again, the articles in the 
EU Treaty state, asylum should be granted for people fleeing from war and terror. They 
should not be denied shelter and sent back to what they were fleeing from in the first place: 
“The Chancellor said she would leave no stone unturned in bringing about a European-
Turkish solution....To this end, the causes of migration will have to be tackled, the EU 
external borders- particularly between Greece and Turkey- protected and the entry of 
refugees organised and managed.” (Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, 17.02.2016) 
The fourth indicator: the Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect 
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. (Policies in national 
security, EU level policy in promoting the ability to protect oneself) It emerges from the 
documents that the way Germany has imposed its vision on how to deal with the refugee 
crisis and strongly suggesting that they host a fair bulk of the asylum seekers goes against 
this very article: “Only together will we succeed in distributing the refugees fairly and 
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equitably among all the member states. A first step has been taken. For this too I would like 
to thank the Parliament, or rather a majority thereof. Let’s be honest, the Dublin procedure 
in its current form is obsolete in practice. The intention behind it was good, of that there 
can be no doubt. But, all in all, it has not proven viable when faced with the current 
challenges at our external borders. I therefore advocate the adoption of a new approach 
based on fairness and solidarity in sharing the burdens. I welcome the Commission’s work 
in this regard. I think it is good that Germany and France are in agreement on this point.” 
(Merkel, 07.10.2015) The Dublin agreement which is of central focus on this statement is 
the Regulation which was created in order to quickly identify the Member State responsible 
for examining an asylum application, and to prevent abuse of asylum procedures. The 
Dublin Regulation establishes the principle that only one Member State is responsible for 
examining an asylum application. The objective is to avoid asylum seekers from being sent 
from one country to another, and also to prevent abuse of the system by the submission of 
several applications for asylum by one person. (Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003) 
What was achieved with this regulation though is exactly what was aimed to avoid- the 
asylum seekers now, were able to choose on their own which nation they wished to seek 
asylum in. When before they were just granted or denied refuge, they now travelled from 
one country to another on their own will and wish. This created a kind of a corridor from 
Greece to Scandinavia or Western Europe.  
Conclusion  
In the refugee crisis Greece was once again of central attention. It became the main entry 
point for the influx of the refugees into the European Union. As was stated in the beginning 
of this chapter, three million refugees have been produced by the Syrian war. Six and a half 
million, or one-third, of Syrian people are displaced. The time span of the case study 
conducted on the refugee crisis is from January 2014- March 2016. During that time period 
over 900 000 refugees entered Europe and most of them found shelter in Germany. What 
emerged from the case studies conducted is again, the projection of Germany’s policies on 
the EU level. The way the EU policies towards refugees changes when Germany’s policies 
changes was interesting to observe. While at first, Germany welcomed the asylum seekers 
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with open arms, they in the end of the research period were looking for not to solve the 
problems of the asylum seekers and how to integrate them- this was not the mains subject 
of the documents- but instead how to keep them out and to control the amount of refugees 
entering the EU. Thus, as was mentioned the very policies of Germany and the EU towards 
refugees go directly against the articles of the EU Treaty on which the indicators were 
based.  
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Conclusion  
To conclude this thesis, Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) as a theory was introduced and 
analysed in order to ascertain why it was the most suitable framework for this thesis. The 
reasons why LI was a strong theory and thus a good conceptual background was analysed 
and proved in the light of the paper written by Sutton and Staw, which formulated five 
elements that were used instead of theories in papers. Secondly, two paradigms of the 
projection of Germany’s influence was assessed- more precisely the national and 
supranational influence of Germany on the policies connected to the cases analysed. The 
aim of the case studies was to dissect the complex issues taking place in the EU and within 
its immediate neighbouring areas. The three crises that were chosen for research for this 
thesis were the security crisis, the refugee crisis and the Eurozone crisis in the EU. These 
three issues that the EU faced have significantly influenced each state within the union and 
the EU as an organisation as a whole. Thus analysing Germany’s political projection of its 
influence on the policies on the supranational level and comparing them with national 
policies was a good way to determine whether or not the policies practiced nationally and 
supra-nationally overlap. The security crisis in the EU referred to Russia’s growing 
hostility towards the west and annexation of Crimea. The refugee crisis referred to the Syria 
migrant crisis that started in the beginning of 2015. And the Eurozone crisis to the 
economic collapse of Greece and the subsequent effect this incident has had on the 
Eurozone and the EU as a whole. When studying the three proposed cases the thesis 
focused on the analysis of Germany’s official discourse as reflected by official 
speeches/releases available in English from the German government officials as primary 
resources. In order to consistently capture the features of Germany’s discourse as an 
indicator of the country’s influence on the EU decision-making process critical discourse 
analysis was applied for the three case studies. 
The security case study chapter of this thesis highlighted the importance of the Ukraine 
crisis and the implication it has had on the notion of security in the European Union and 
Germany’s role in creating an EU-level policy towards it. With terrorism looming deep 
inside the EU and with no visible solution offered to this threat to the European way of life 
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the Ukraine crisis seems to have taken a secondary seat in the “important issues list”. But it 
is vital to note that terrorism has not had such a groundbreaking influence on the European 
Union and never will as the threat of terrorism does not come from an enemy who is at the 
same time a neighbour. Russia is a tangible threat that endangers the whole idea of Europe- 
something that terrorism will never be able to do. The security crisis that became evident 
with the annexation of Crimea is that one nation threatens the sovereignty and self-
determination of other nations, also something that terrorism has not done. The economic 
sanctions confirm the supremacy of German decisions in the EU. The possibility of further 
sanctions and the extension of them were always seen as a feasible option. And the 
sanctions were extended in June, 2015 even though some of the eastern members of the EU 
would have preferred or largely benefitted from the opposite. What Germany has pressed 
on- and subsequently the whole of the European Union- is that there can only be a peaceful 
solution to the crisis. The Minsk agreement is the founding document for this solution but 
as can be seen from the analysis presented in the security crisis chapter, it has become more 
of an excuse for the EU not to deal with the issue. It appeared that every time the Ukrainian 
subject was approached the Minsk agreement was mentioned instead of actual solutions 
that would offer some progress to the stale standoff. The frozen situation in Ukraine does 
not however mean that Germany will stop lobbying for closer military cooperation between 
the EU members  
From the Eurozone crisis chapter one can conclude that the ECB was founded mostly 
according to German desires to have an ECB which mirrored closely the powers and status 
of the Bundesbank. (Robbins, 2015, pp186) In a way it could be said then that Alexis 
Tsipras was correct in blaming the EU and moreover the “strict” and “hard-handed” 
Germans in their debt crisis because what Germany and thus the EU were aiming for was to 
have consistent fiscal systems in every Eurozone nation. Germany however has not bent the 
rules to accommodate the Greek government and thus either has the EU or the ECB. As 
Merkel said: “The conditions are now the same for all countries concerned,” adding that: 
“I think that was very important to strengthen the euro.” (The Press and Information Office 
of the Federal Government, 16.08.2015) Germany has fought hard to keep the EU together 
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and to prevent the collapse of the Eurozone, from the documents that were analysed for this 
chapter that was the message which was present most.  
The crisis in Greece is also important as it seems to be the point where Germany finally 
accepted its leading role in Europe. With the Ukraine crisis-or the security crisis- Germany 
preferred to lean on France and seemed to highlight cooperation with some other EU 
member. This was not the case with the Eurozone crisis. Germany took control over 
negotiations and lobbied for closer control over the financial matters of the Eurozone 
members and was very strict in not alleviating the financial responsibilities of Greece.  
In the refugee crisis Greece was once again of central attention. It became the main entry 
point for the influx of the refugees into the European Union. As was stated in the beginning 
of this chapter, three million refugees have been produced by the Syrian war. Six and a half 
million, or one-third, of Syrian people are displaced. The time span of the case study 
conducted on the refugee crisis is from January 2014- March 2016. During that time period 
over 900 000 refugees entered Europe and most of them found shelter in Germany. What 
emerged from the case studies conducted is again, the projection of Germany’s policies on 
the EU level. The way the EU policies towards refugees changes when Germany’s policies 
changes was interesting to observe. While at first, Germany welcomed the asylum seekers 
with open arms, they in the end of the research period were looking for not to solve the 
problems of the asylum seekers and how to integrate them- this was not the mains subject 
of the documents- but instead how to keep them out and to control the amount of refugees 
entering the EU. Thus, as was mentioned the very policies of Germany and the EU towards 
refugees go directly against the articles of the EU Treaty on which the indicators were 
based.  
It is interesting how a kind of a circle has been made with the subjects of the chapters of 
this thesis. First came the security crisis with its problems in Ukraine and with Russia, but 
not only; the EU’s willingness to act in unison was also under scrutiny. Secondly, came the 
Eurozone crisis, which had the same issue of cooperation and harmony between the 
nations. Greece was the main point of worry in the Eurozone crisis and again during the 
third subjects which was the refugee crisis as it served as the main entry point for refugees 
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into the EU. The refugee crisis again questioned the security of the peoples of Europe 
which again leads the reader back to the security crisis. Now, the role of Germany in all of 
it, one has to conclude, of central value. Germany is the central player on all the stages of 
the issues Europe is facing- the stages are different, not the main character. The influence 
Germany has had, according to the documents analysed, in unparalleled to any other EU 
nation. Is this kind of power good or bad, one cannot tell as the play is not over and the 
crises have not been solved.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union  
Article 41 
1. Administrative expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise for the 
institutions shall be charged to the Union budget. 
2. Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also 
be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations 
having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously 
decides otherwise. 
In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it shall be charged to the 
Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council 
acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having 
military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have 
made a formal declaration under 
Article 31(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing 
thereof. 
3. The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing 
rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the 
framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory 
activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43. It shall act after 
consulting the European Parliament. 
Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43 which are not 
charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member 
States' contributions. The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions 
establishing:  
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(a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts 
allocated to the fund; 
(b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund;  
(c) the financial control procedures. 
When the task planned in accordance with Article 42(1) and Article 43 cannot be charged 
to the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the High Representative to use the fund. 
The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit. 
Article 42 
1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common 
foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity 
drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions 
outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities 
provided by the Member States. 
2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a 
common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the 
European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend 
to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements.  
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the 
specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and 
shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common 
defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the 
North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence 
policy established within that framework. 
3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union 
for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to 
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the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together 
establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security 
and defence policy. 
Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. 
The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition 
and armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the European Defence Agency") shall 
identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those 
requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing 
any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the 
defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments 
policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military 
capabilities. 
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those 
initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High 
Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union 
instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate. 
5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a 
group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its 
interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44. 
6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which 
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the 
most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within 
the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not 
affect the provisions of Article 43. 
7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
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This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of 
certain Member States. 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments 
under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are 
members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for 
its implementation. 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union; 2012) 
Appendix 2 
Indicator 
Level of debate 
National  EU 
common security and defence policy is 
an integral part of the common foreign 
and security policy (statements and 
policies towards/about the situation in 
Ukraine; changes in policies because 
of the situation in Ukraine) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(63 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x (60 times) 
the common security and defence 
policy shall include the progressive 
framing of a common Union defence 
policy (common defence policy 
against Russia’s aggression) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x (45 
times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x (45 times) 
member states shall make civilian and 
military capabilities available to the 
Union for the implementation of the 
common security and defence policy, 
to contribute to the objectives defined 
by the Council (what are the 
objectives? Willingness to contribute 
military means. (for securing border 
members against potential 
aggression)) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x (21 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x (18 times) 
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decisions relating to the common 
security and defence policy, including 
those initiating a mission as referred 
to in this Article, shall be adopted by 
the Council acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy or an initiative from 
Member State (initiatives 
taken/decisions made) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(15 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (14 
times) 
the Council may entrust the execution 
of a task, within the Union framework, 
to a group of Member States in order 
to protect the Union's values and serve 
its interests (participation in execution 
of tasks/ defining of interests) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x (24 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x (21 times) 
those Member States whose military 
capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding 
commitments to one another in this 
area with a view to the most 
demanding missions shall establish 
permanent structured cooperation 
within the Union framework (readiness 
to cooperate; level of military 
capabilities (shows Germany’s 
diversity and readiness in participating 
in policy enforcement- which policies 
count?) 
x x x x x x x x x x x (11 
times) 
x x x x x x x x x (9 times) 
if a Member State is the victim of 
armed aggression on its territory, the 
other Member States shall have 
x x x x x x (6 times) x x x x x x x (7 times) 
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towards it an obligation of aid and 
assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter 
(attention to potential enforcement of 
this policy) 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union; 2012) 
Appendix 3 
Indicator 
Level of debate 
National  EU 
Minimum reserves: ECB may require credit institutions 
established in Member States to hold minimum reserve 
on accounts with the ECB and national central banks in 
pursuance of monetary policy objectives. Regulations 
concerning the calculation and determination of the 
required minimum reserves may be established by the 
Governing Council. In cases of noncompliance the ECB 
shall be entitled to levy penalty interest and to impose 
other sanctions with comparable effect. (How does 
Germany’s vision of minimum reserves comply with the 
Council’s vision, penalties made, attention to fulfilling 
the reserve goal) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x(35 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x (22 times) 
Sanctions: The Council shall, in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article 41, define the basis for 
minimum reserves and the maximum permissible ratios 
between those reserves and their basis, as well as the 
appropriate sanctions in cases of 
noncompliance.(Germany’s vision of penalties or 
noncompliance sanctions- attention to potential 
enforcement of this policy; the proposed necessity for 
punishment) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x (13 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x (13 times) 
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The Governing Council may, by a majority of two thirds 
of the votes cast, decide upon the use of such other 
operational methods of monetary control as it sees fit, 
respecting Article 2. The Council shall, in accordance 
with the procedure laid down in Article 41, define the 
scope of such methods if they impose obligations on 
third parties. (Germany’s offered methods to dealing 
with the Greek crisis and the methods and used so far, 
what are the proposed methods, pressure put on to the 
Council to achieve monetary control) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x 
(21 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
(22 times) 
The ECB shall make recommendations and deliver 
opinions. (How much of the delivered decisions, 
recommendations and regulations collide with 
Germany’s national policy) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x (79 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x x  
(77 times) 
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States 
before the Treaties as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. It shall respect their essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of 
the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. (Germany’s policies in ensuring the 
safeguarding of this Article vs supranational policies 
when researching the Eurozone crisis) 
x x x x x x x x x (9 
times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
(11times) 
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Indicator Level of debate 
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National  EU 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail. (Germany’s policies to 
ensure asylum compared to supranational policies when 
analysing the refugee crisis, changes made in this area 
during the crisis, policy changes on border control) 
 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x (94 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x (78 times) 
The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, 
security and justice without internal frontiers, in which 
the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction 
with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention 
and combating of crime. (Germany’s policies in these 
areas compared to supranational policies, 
decisions/changes made in this area) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x (56 times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x x 
(54 times) 
The Union shall combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice and 
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity 
between generations and protection of the rights of the 
child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall 
respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall 
ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and 
enhanced. (Germany’s policies in these areas compared to 
supranational policies, decisions/changes made in this 
area) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x x x x x x (20 
times) 
x x x x x x x x x x x 
x x x x  (15 times) 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  
92 
 
uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall 
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development 
of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and 
the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of 
the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law, including respect for 
the principles of the United Nations Charter. (Germany’s 
values compared to the EU’s, work done to promote and 
develop the values and beliefs within the EU and outside) 
x x (13 times) (11 times) 
The Union shall develop a special relationship with 
neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the 
values of the Union and characterised by close and 
peaceful relations based on cooperation. (Germany’s 
policies in these areas compared to supranational policies, 
decisions/changes made in this area) 
x x x x x x x x x (10 
times) 
x x x x x x x x x (9 
times) 
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Kokkuvõte 
Käesolev magistritöö uurib Saksamaa riikliku tasandi poliitika mõju peegeldust Euroopa 
Liidu tasandil. Teemakohane uuring viiakse läbi kolme aktuaalse kriisi näitel, mis on 
raputanud Euroopa Liitu (EL). antud kriisideks on julgeolekukriis, põgenikekriis ja 
eurotsoonikriis. Iga eelnimetatud ELi-i tabanud probleemistik, millega nüüd silmitsi 
seistakse, ei ole mõjutanud mitte ainult liitu üldiselt, vaid ka kõiki 28-liiget individuaalselt. 
Seetõttu, analüüsides Saksamaa poliitilise mõju peegeldust liidutasandil otsuste tegemisele 
ja nende võrdlemine riigitasandil tehtud otsustega, annab hea võimaluse tuvastada, kas 
riigitasandil tehtud otsused ja praktiseeritav poliitika kattuvad liidutasandil tehtud  
otsustega ja praktiseeritava poliitikaga.  
Magistritöö sissejuhatus tutvustab lugejale Saksamaa- kui käesoleva uurimuse keskse riigi 
ajalugu alates Teisest maailmasõjas, et luua tööle teemakohane raamistik ja tuua välja 
olulisemad asjaolud, mis mängivad Saksamaa praeguse poliitika ja positsiooni tekkimisel 
olulist rolli.  
Antud magistritöö sisu on jagatud kolme peatükki: esimene peatükk tutvustab töö 
teoreetilist raamistikku, milleks on liberaalne valitsustevahelisuse (LI) teooria. Peatükis 
tutvustatakse teooria põhialuseid ja mõtestatakse ning seotakse töös käsitletavaga. 
Käesoleva magistritöö nägemus LI teooriast põhineb selle looja Andrew Moravcsiku 
nägemusel. Lisaks LI teooriale kasutatakse töös ka kriitilise diskursusanalüüsi, et töös 
käsitletavate juhtumite analüüs oleks põhjalik ja sisukas. Seetõttu antakse ka kriitilise 
diskursuse analüüsi lähenemisest ja põhitõdedest teooria peatükis asjakohane ülevaade.  
Teine peatükk käsitleb käesoleva magistritöö metodoloogiat. Tutvustatakse lähemalt 
uurimuse läbiviimise käiku ja materjalide valikut ning kasutamist. Uurimus põhineb 
Saksamaa Föderaalvalitsuse koduleheküljel valikult saadaolevatel inglisekeelsetel 
dokumentidel (töö valim). Kõik kolme kriisi puudutavad dokumendid, mis antud nõuetele 
vastasid, olid osaks teemade analüüsil. Kolme teema analüüs põhineb 5-7 indikaatoril, mille 
aluseks on Euroopa Liidu aluslepingu artiklid. Kuna tegu on dokumentide analüüsiga 
kolme kriisi puhul ja metodoloogia ning teooria osas kasutatakse, akadeemilisi raamatuid 
ning artikleid- on käesoleva magistritöö uurimistöö stiil kvalitatiivne.  
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Nagu eelnevalt mainitud, sisaldab magistritöö uuriv osa kolme kriisi käsitlemist. Nendeks 
kriisideks on julgeolekukriis, põgenikekriis ja eurotsoonikriis Euroopa Liidus.  
Julgeolekukriis viitab Venemaa kasvavale vaenulikkusele suhetes Euroopa Liiduga ja 
temapoolsele tegevusele Ukrainas ning krimmi annekteerimist. Saksamaa mõju EL-i 
tasandi poliitikale kajastub selle kriisi puhul kõige paremini Minski leppes ja sanktsioonide 
jätkuvas kasutamises Venemaa vastu. Minski leppe üks aktiivsemaid pooldajaid oligi 
Saksamaa, kelle leppe koostamise Euroopapoolseks liitlaseks oli Prantsusmaa. 
Sanktsioonide puhul on Saksamaa sirgjooneliselt ajanud nii riiklikul kui ka EL tasandil 
nende jätkamise poliitikat. See on saanud ka EL-i poliitikaks, kuigi paljud liikmesmaad on 
sanktsioonide suhtes olnud kriitilised. Nende pikaajaline kestvus on negatiivselt mõjutanud 
mitmete EL bloki riikide majandust, kelle suurimaks välispartneriks on Venemaa. 
Saksamaa mõju on samuti tuntav Euroopa keskse julgeolekupoliitika propageerimisel ja 
selle arendamise jätkamisel, et tagada EL maade julgeolekut ka ilma NATO suurima 
liikme- USA- kohalolekuta.  
Põgenikekriis viitab 2014. aastal alanud suurimat põgenikevoolu Euroopasse, peale Teist 
maailmasõda. Uuring viidi läbi ajaperioodil jaanuar 2014 kuni märts 2016 avaldatud 
dokumentide suhtes. Alates 2014. aastast, on EL-i välispiiride äärde saabunud üle miljoni 
inimese, et saada asüüli mõnes EL riigis. Põgenikest enamus saabub EL välispiiride äärde 
Süüriast, mida 5-aastane kodusõda on laastanud. Süürias valitsev igapäevane terror ja 
inimõiguste ränk ignoreerimine on pannud migreeruma mitmeid kümneid miljoneid 
inimesi. Käesoleva magistritöö põhilisteks uurimisvaldkondadeks on uurida Saksamaa 
mõju põgenikepoliitikas asüülitaotlejate vastuvõtmisel ja riigi tegevust EL välispiiril 
Kreekas, mis on uurimisperioodi ajal saabuvate põgenike sissepääsupunktiks. Uuring 
näitas, et taaskord oli võimalik tuvastada Saksamaa riikliku poliitika peegeldumist EL 
tasandil. Kõige selgemini tuli see peegeldus välja perioodi jooksul toimunud suhtumise 
muutumises põgenike vastu. Kui alguses võeti asüülitaotlejaid vastu avasüli, siis 
uurimisperioodi lõpuks keskenduti viiside leidmisele, kuidas nende kontrollimatut 
sissevoolu peatada ning EL välispiire tugevdada. Kuna uuringu indikaatoritena kasutati EL 
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aluslepingut, siis avaldus põgenikekriisi peatükis ka viis, kuidas nende samade artiklite 
vastu uurimisperioodi lõpus kasutatava põgenikepoliitikaga eksitakse.  
Eurotsooni kriis viitab Kreeka pankrotiga alguse saanud majanduskriisile. Euroopa 
keskpank, mis rajati Saksamaa eestvedamisel Saksamaa Föderaalpanga eeskujul, on 
esmaseks Saksamaa riigiülese mõju indikaatoriks. Teiseks tuleneb uuringust, et Saksamaa 
on aktiivset lobitööd, et saavutada ühene fiskaalpoliitika kõikides eurotsooni riikides. See 
on samuti saanud EL poliitikaks, mida üritatakse peale eurokriisi algust aktiivselt 
kehtestada. Kreeka kriisi puhul on Saksamaa ja EL kindlaks lähenemiseks olnud mitte teha 
Kreekale mööndusi. Saksamaa suhtumiseks on, et kõikidele liikmesriikidele kehtivad 
samad reeglid ja Kreeka ei erine teistest eurotsooni riikidest. Samas on Saksamaa saanud 
Kreeka kriisile lahenduse leidmise aktiivseks eestvedajaks, et hoida koos nii Euroopa Liitu 
kui eurotsooni.  
Analüüsi käigus uuritud dokumentidest saadud andmete põhjal võib järeldada, et Kreeka 
kriis on oluline veel seetõttu, et selle käigus aktsepteeris Saksamaa lõplikult oma 
liidripositsiooni Euroopas. Kui Ukraina- ehk siis julgeoleku- kriisi puhul eelistas Saksamaa 
mitte tegutseda üksi ja kaasas olude lahendamisse aktiivselt Prantsusmaad, et soodustada 
riikidevahelist koostööd, siis eurotsooni kriisiga see muutus. Saksamaa võttis läbirääkimiste 
üle kontrolli ja tegi aktiivset lobitööd, et saavutada riikideülene parem kontroll eurotsooni 
riikide rahaasjade üle ning et mitte teha Kreekale kriisi lahendamisel mööndusi.  
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